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TOO CLEVER BY HALF: REFLECTIONS ON 
PERCEPTION, LEGITIMACY, AND CHOICE OF 
LAW UNDER REVISED ARTICLE 1 OF THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
MARK EDWIN BURGE* 
ABSTRACT 
The overwhelmingly successful 2001 rewrite of Article 1 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code was accompanied by an overwhelming failure: proposed 
section 1-301 on contractual choice of law. As originally sent to the states, 
section 1-301 would have allowed non-consumer parties to a contract to se-
lect a governing law that bore no relation to their transaction. Proponents 
justifiably contended that such autonomy was consistent with emerging in-
ternational norms and with the nature of contracts creating voluntary private 
obligations. Despite such arguments, the original version of section 1-301 
was resoundingly rejected, gaining zero adoptions by the states before its 
withdrawal in 2008. This Article contends that this political failure within the 
simultaneous overall success of Revised Article 1 was due in significant part 
to proposed section 1-301 invoking a negative visceral reaction from its 
American audience. This reaction occurred not because of state or national 
parochialism, but because the concept of unbounded choice of law violated 
cultural symbols and myths about the nature of law. The American social 
and legal culture aspires to the ideal that “no one is above the law” and the 
related ideal of maintaining “a government of laws, and not of men.” Pro-
posed section 1-301 transgressed those ideals by taking something labeled as 
“law” and turning on its head the expected norm of general applicability. 
Future proponents of law reform arising from internationalization would 
do well to consider the role of symbolic ideals in their targeted jurisdic-
tions. While proposed section 1-301 made much practical sense, it failed 
in part because it did not—to an American audience—make sense in theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The ideals that “no one is above the law”1 in a properly representative 
democracy and that a fundamental function of such a republic is to provide 
for “a government of laws, and not of men”2 are deeply rooted in American 
popular and political culture. The aspiration to equally applicable law remains 
even when the American legal system falls short of these ideals. Consider 
how atypical a movement or campaign would be that explicitly promoted 
uneven application of the law: “Vote for me, and I promise to shower legal 
privileges on a chosen few!” Laws or policies that in fact do promote 
different treatment must either include an ostensible explanation grounded 
in the language of equality under the law,3 or else they must remain stealthy. 
In a culture aspiring to legal egalitarianism, no one praises disparate legal 
treatment as a standalone virtue. Thus, rhetorical attacks on “the one per-
cent” from the populist left4 and on “crony capitalism” from the populist 
right5 share at least one common trait: a deep-seated belief that laws should 
                                                                                                                         
1 This popular maxim has been stated in many forms. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 
106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (“No man in this country is so high that he is above the law.”); 
Theodore Roosevelt, Third Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1903), quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, 
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 576 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992) (“No man is above the law and 
no man is below it; nor do we ask any man's permission when we require him to obey it.”).  
2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of the United States 
has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly 
cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a 
vested legal right.”); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 23 (1958) (quoting the 1780 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, credited to John Adams). In a related formulation, 
the “rule of men” is unfavorably contrasted with “the rule of law.” See, e.g., Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 3 (1997) (“Within perhaps the most familiar understanding of this distinction, the law—and 
its meaning—must be fixed and publicly known in advance of application, so that those 
applying the law, as much as those to whom it is applied, can be bound by it. If courts (or 
the officials of any other institution) could make law in the guise of applying it, we would 
have the very ‘rule of men’ with which the Rule of Law is supposed to contrast.”).  
3 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding law school admissions 
policies could include diversity as a factor for review because it could promote equality); 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969) (holding that welfare benefits balanced the interests 
of the recipient and the interests of the State, promoting equality).   
4 See, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher, As the Economy Recovers, the Richest Are Getting 
Richer, Study Shows, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2013, at A16, archived at http://perma.cc 
/R5JR-DA8G (“The issue of inequality leapt to prominence in late 2011, when supporters 
of the Occupy Wall Street movement began setting up encampments in Washington, 
Lower Manhattan and elsewhere to protest the financial chasm between the wealthiest 
one percent of Americans and the rest.”). 
5 See, e.g., Michael S. Rosenwald & Antonio Olivo, Capitalism, Ethics Drive Brat's 
Worldview, WASH. POST, June 12, 2014, at A09, archived at http://perma.cc/7XU-MLCZ 
(describing the successful primary unseating of sitting Republican House Majority Leader 
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apply to everyone. Special rules are an aberration that must be explained 
by prudence or necessity because they violate the norm of general appli-
cability.6 Stated differently, populists at both ends of the ideological spec-
trum are accusing their opponents of committing no less than an American 
heresy by placing a privileged class both above and outside of the law. 
This Article is a significant rethinking of what occurred when legal and 
academic elites charged into a populist heresy and were soundly rebuffed, 
a rebuff most notable for having been part of a tremendous success: revis-
ing Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The UCC is widely 
recognized as one of the great successes in the nearly century-long history 
of drafting uniform state laws and model acts.7 With varying degrees of 
uniformity, most parts of this joint enterprise between the American Law 
Institute (ALI) and Uniform Law Commission (ULC)8 have been adopted 
in all 50 states—even in the civil law jurisdiction of Louisiana.9 Perhaps 
more remarkable than the UCC’s wide adoption in the 1960s10 is that the 
Code has been the subject of major revisions over the past fifty years,11 
and these revisions have themselves gained widespread adoption comparable 
                                                                                                                         
as a “nuanced and populist primary campaign not against big business, but crony capitalism 
and the Wall Street ‘crooks’ who ... cheat and destroy a beautiful system.”). 
6  See Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process 
Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 103 (2007) (observing that the appeal to equal liberty reflects 
“an egalitarian strain in the American legal tradition” and that this strain is ancient in its 
origin, dating as far back as Aristotle). 
7 See, e.g., Henry Gabriel, The Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code: How Suc-
cessful Has It Been?, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 653, 654–55 (2001) (“[T]here is a lot of successful 
history behind the Code …. For the present, the UCC is now fifty years old, and it has 
been showing its age …. Much of the Code has been revised to reflect contemporary busi-
ness practices and it continues to guide commercial law and practice in America. Success 
is success.”). 
8 In 2007, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) 
adopted Uniform Law Commission (ULC) as its descriptive name, while retaining NCCUSL 
as its formal name. For convenience and consistency, this Article will refer to this orga-
nization as the Uniform Law Commission or ULC, even when discussing matters in 
which the organization was involved prior to 2007. See About the ULC, UNIFORM LAW 
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlawcommission.com/Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the 
%20ULC (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/YV9U-FKW9. 
9 Gabriel, supra note 7, at 654 & n.1. Louisiana has most notably not adopted the 
common-law inspired Article 2 on sales of goods and Article 2A on leases of goods, both 
of which it rejected as being incompatible with its civil law of obligations derived from 
the Napoleonic Code. 
10 Pennsylvania adopted the Uniform Commercial Code in 1953, followed by Massa-
chusetts in 1957, and Connecticut in 1959. The bulk of adoptions occurred in the 1960s, 
however, and by 1967 the UCC had been substantially enacted by every state except 
Louisiana. See William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 10 (1967). 
11 See Gabriel, supra note 7, at 655. 
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to that of the original UCC. One of the more recent major changes was the 
revision of Article 1—general provisions for the entire Code—in 2001. Re-
vised Article 1 has been a political success, at least as evidenced by the forty-
five and growing number of states that have adopted the vast majority of it.12 
Arguably, the most prominent innovation of Revised Article 1 as orig-
inally conceived was proposed section 1-301 concerning choice of law.13 
The statute would have allowed non-consumer contracting parties to choose 
the law of any jurisdiction to govern their transaction, even where the juris-
diction bore no relationship to the underlying transaction.14 Proposed sec-
tion 1-301 was itself a “significant rethinking”15 of choice-of-law rules, and 
many scholars and commentators contended that the idea was one whose 
time had come.16 Yet, out of all the states that enacted Revised Article 1, 
none enacted section 1-301 as it was proposed.  The year 2008 was thus an 
atypical moment in UCC history when the ALI and the ULC finally with-
drew proposed section 1-301 and replaced it with the pre-revision law.17 
Given passage of enough time for the dust to settle, a reflective post-
mortem now seems appropriate. 
Regardless of the international precedent18 and transactional logic19 in 
its favor, proposed section 1-301 aroused a strong negative reaction because 
it appeared, at first blush, to be a frontal assault on a foundational principle 
to the public legitimacy of the law in the United States: absent necessity, the 
coverage of a legal rule should be general. While Americans are as prone 
as any to praise the virtues of a free market, they—at least outside of the 
academy20—do not tend to view law as an enterprise out of which parties 
                                                                                                                         
12 See generally Unif. Commercial Code, 1 U.L.A. 5–6 (Supp. 2014) (listing forty-
five states plus the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands in a table of jurisdictions 
where Revised Article 1 was in effect as of July 1, 2013). Of course, any jurisdiction 
substantially adopting Revised Article 1 may also have included state-specific non-
uniform provisions, such as the notable minority that did not adopt the revision’s 
definition of “good faith.” See generally Keith A. Rowley, The Often Imitated, But (Still) 
Not Yet Duplicated, Revised UCC Article 1 (Aug. 15, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc 
/ARJ4-CPXX (updating substantially through July 1, 2011 the earlier-published article, 
Keith A. Rowley, The Often Imitated, But Not Yet Duplicated, Revised UCC Article 1,  38 
U.C.C. L.J. 195 (2006)). 
13 See Rowley, supra note 12, at 78. 
14 See id., at 67, 19. 
15 See Lance Liebman et al., Proposal to Amend Official Text of § 1-301 (Territorial 
Applicability; Parties Power to Choose Applicable Law) of Revised Article 1 of the UCC 
(2008), available at http://perma.cc/D2GE-LGG5. 
16 See Rowley, supra note 12, at 78. 
17 See Liebman, supra note 15, at 9.  
18 See infra text accompanying notes 7297. 
19 See infra Part II.B, text accompanying notes 14258. 
20 See infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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should have a general free market right to contract. Choice of law is, in 
this view, more akin to a necessary evil than to a systemic good, rather like 
forum shopping in civil litigation. Both are prices one must pay as a con-
sequence of having multiple and overlapping legal systems. Some forum 
shopping is tolerable by necessity,21 yet Americans bristle and cringe when 
the practice goes too far.22 Choice of law likewise shares this trait, at least 
on the surface, of being a “bug” rather than a “feature” of a complex legal 
system. Revised section 1-301 faced a particularly uphill battle to enact-
ment because it went too far outside the American understanding of law. It 
elevated contracting around generally applicable law to a norm rather than 
an exception. The experience of the UCC’s failed journey into the realm of 
unbounded party autonomy is relevant for the future because of what it 
reveals about the perceived boundaries of law in the American tradition, 
boundaries certain to be approached again and again in an era of increasing 
globalization of law and commerce. This failure in the midst of a successful 
lawmaking enterprise contains lessons for the future when viewed through 
the lenses of legal philosophy and political science. 
Part I of this Article describes background history of contractual choice of 
law and the limits on party autonomy, particularly movement from the 
vested-rights approach of the formalist era to the reasonable-relationship 
approach represented by the original UCC and the Restatement (Second) 
of Conflicts of Law.23 Part II describes the drafting process and the argu-
ments by proponents of proposed section 1-301 and documents the ulti-
mate political failure that led to its abandonment in 2008 in the face of the 
otherwise widespread success of Revised Article 1.24 Part III seeks to 
account for the disproportionately negative reaction that many Americans 
have to the idea of unbounded party autonomy and suggests that—rather 
than arising from mere parochialism—the negative reaction is grounded in 
a significant incompatibility with American socio-legal culture.25 The usage 
of foundational symbol and myth drawn from political theory helps ex-
plain the success that certain strands of legal philosophy have had in the 
United States, creating a culture in which unbounded party autonomy in 
choice of law was a step too far. Part IV, using the failure of proposed sec-
tion 1-301 as an object lesson, proposes a framework for understanding 
the dominant American view of general applicability of legal rules and the 
                                                                                                                         
21 See Micheal S. Shenberg, Identification, Tolerability, and Resolution of Intercircuit 
Conflicts: Reexamining Professor Feeney's Study of Conflicts in Federal Law, 59 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1007, 1023 (1984).   
22 See id. 
23 See infra Part I, text accompanying notes 2797. 
24 See infra Part II, text accompanying notes 98186. 
25 See infra Part III, text accompanying notes 187239. 
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relationship of general applicability to legal legitimacy.26 Ultimately, any 
highly visible attempts at legal reform, including changing the nature of 
cross-jurisdictional legal relationships, must pay substantial deference to 
the ideal of general applicability if such reforms are to succeed in the 
United States. 
I. CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW AND THE RETREAT FROM FORMALISM 
For most of the past century, the narrative arc of choice-of-law doctrine 
has been a journey down a one-way street. The departure point is a formalist 
commitment to rigid bright-line rules, followed shortly by the creation of 
escape devices to avoid those rules, and eventually leading to the disposal 
of those rules in favor of flexible alternatives. Beyond that basic narrative, 
however, choice of law as a whole has justifiably been labeled “a morass 
of confusion … universally said to be a disaster,”27 at least in terms of 
adopting an overarching theory to replace the agreed-upon rejection of 
formalism. For contract law, however, the story of choice of law does not 
require delving into across-the-board theory. The tale of contractual choice 
of law begins with autonomy-free formalist rules and proceeds toward ever-
increasing amounts of autonomy for contracting parties. The existence of 
this progression does much to explain why the drafters of Revised Article 1 
crafted section 1-301 as they originally did, and also why an impartial side-
line observer in 2001 might have thought the chances for widespread adop-
tion were much greater than they proved to be. 
A. From Formalism to Limited Autonomy 
The formalist approach to law that dominated the United States in the 
early part of the twentieth century has been likened to a false religion,28 
with subsequent legal history being the story of its vanquishing. As to the 
substantive law of contracts, for example, one might view Samuel Williston, 
reporter for the first Restatement of Contracts, as the false prophet of for-
malism. In this understanding, Williston’s unrelentingly mechanical view of 
contract was defeated by just and humane legal realists, such as Arthur 
Corbin and Karl Llewellyn.29 As Williston was to contracts, so was Joseph 
                                                                                                                         
26 See infra Part IV, text accompanying notes 241250. 
27 Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. 
L. REV. 2448, 2449 (1999). 
28  See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of 
Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 950 (1988) (“Formalism is like a heresy driven underground, 
whose tenets must be surmised from the derogatory comments of its detractors.”). 
29 See Franklin G. Snyder, Clouds of Mystery: Dispelling the Realist Rhetoric of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 11, 12 (2007) (analogizing the triumph of 
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Beale to choice of law, an “arch-priest” of formalism whose teachings were 
ultimately unmasked and driven from legal orthodoxy.30 Beale saw choice 
of law as mechanical and bright-line, hinging upon the geographic birth-
place of “vested rights.”31 A court, upon determining the place where a par-
ticular legal right vested, would be obligated to apply that jurisdiction’s 
law. Thus, a cause of action for a tort must be governed by the place where 
the tort occurred because that was the place where the plaintiff’s legal 
rights, if any, sprang into existence.32 The formalist vested-rights view was 
memorialized in the 1934 first Restatement of Conflict of Laws, for which 
Beale served as Reporter. The first Restatement dominated American con-
flicts thinking in the first part of the twentieth century.33 
For contract law, the concept that parties might choose their own gov-
erning law is not even accounted for in the first Restatement, so alien was 
the concept of party autonomy.34 In his treatise, Beale admitted that some 
courts had allowed parties to choose the governing law for their contracts, 
but he found that allowance to be both theoretically and practically objec-
tionable.35 The theoretical problem was that allowing contractual choice of 
law, in Beale’s view, made the contracting parties into a virtual legislature 
by permitting them to “do a legislative act,” which could be contrary to the 
sovereign will of the state whose law authorized the making of the contract in 
the first place.36 Granting such extraordinary power to individuals was an 
                                                                                                                         
the Uniform Commercial Code over its formalist predecessors to the overthrow of the 
Titans in Greek and Roman mythology). 
30 See William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 MD. L. REV. 1371, 
1376 (1997) (calling Joseph Beale the “arch-priest” of vested-rights theory whose “Sacred 
Text was the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws”). 
31 EDWIN SCOTT FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW FOR AMERICAN COURTS: A MULTI-
LATERALIST METHOD 1112 (Greenwood Press 2001) (summarizing Joseph H. Beale’s 
theory of territorial vested rights). 
32 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934) (“The law of the 
place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury.”); see also 2 
JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1289 (1935) (“The existence 
and nature of a cause of action for a tort is governed by the law of the place where the 
plaintiff’s alleged right to be free from the act or event complained of is alleged to have 
been violated by a wrongful act or omission. It follows therefore that the law of the place 
of the wrong determines whether or not there is a cause of action for the wrong.”). 
33 Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining 
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1840 (2005); FRUEHWALD, 
supra note 31, at 10; Roosevelt, supra note 27, at 2449 n.6 (describing Beale’s theory of 
vested rights as “received wisdom for the first half of the twentieth century”). 
34 See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 311376 (cover-
ing the entirety of Chapter 8 of first Restatement, entitled “Contracts”). 
35 See BEALE, supra note 32, at 1080. 
36 Id. at 107980. 
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invitation to mischief.37 Beale’s practical objection, oddly enough, was that 
allowing parties to choose their governing law would actually increase trans-
actional uncertainty because courts might not accept the parties’ choice,38 
which of course is precisely what Beale thought courts ought to do. The 
vested-rights approach tended to be dogmatic in the certainty of its rules. 
Beale’s description of the proper approach for determining contract validity, 
for example, left no room for party autonomy: 
The question of whether a contract is valid … can on general principles 
be determined by no other law than that which applies to the [parties’] 
acts, that is, by the law of the place of the contracting. If the law at that 
place annexes an obligation to the acts of the parties, the promise has a 
legal right which no other law has power to take away except as a re-
sult of new acts which change it. If on the other hand the law of the 
place where the agreement is made annexes no legal obligation to it, there 
is no other law which has power to do so.39 
Thus, the forum court would generally have no choice but to enforce the 
legal rights as and where they vested. The rigid and highly mechanical rules 
of the first Restatement did not consider policy concerns or desirability of 
outcome, though the Restatement did contain a limited escape device40 for 
when the other jurisdiction’s law contravened the “strong public policy” of 
the forum.41 
Despite its initial dominance in American courts, the formalist vested-
rights approach to choice of law had drawn substantial criticism even before 
the publication of the first Restatement. Early critics such as Walter Wheeler 
Cook,42 Ernest Lorenzen,43 and David Cavers44 attacked the vested-rights 
                                                                                                                         
37 Id. at 1080 (“The meaning of the suggestion, in short, is that since the parties can 
adopt any foreign law at their pleasure to govern their act, that at their will they can free 
themselves from the power of the law which would otherwise apply to their acts.”) 
38 Id. at 1085 (“[C]ounsel sufficiently familiar with the law might advise the parties to 
agree expressly upon the law of one state or the other as the law intended by them to 
apply to their agreement. Here, however, we are met by the difficulty that the courts will 
not necessarily enforce such an agreement or accept it as an expression of the real bona 
fide intention of the parties.”). 
39 Id. at 1091 (emphasis added). 
40 FRUEHWALD, supra note 31, at 12. 
41 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934) (“No action can be 
maintained upon a cause of action created in another state the enforcement of which is 
contrary to the strong public policy of the forum.”) 
42 Walter W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE 
L.J. 457, 45860 (1924). 
43 Ernest G. Lornzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE 
L.J. 736, 74346 (1924). 
44 David Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 
194 (1933); see also DAVID CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 9 (1965). 
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approach for failing to explain what the courts were actually doing and should 
be doing, namely, considering issues of policy. The critics—particularly 
the legal realists—ultimately gained the upper hand in the late 1950s with 
the writings of Brainerd Currie.45 Currie rejected the bright-line certainty 
of Beale and the first Restatement in favor of interest analysis, which held 
that a court should examine the policies behind competing law in light of 
specific case facts in order to determine which jurisdiction’s policies were 
implicated.46  Among academics, interest analysis has become “the leading 
scholarly position, and the only doctrine that could plausibly claim to have 
generated a school of adherents.”47  Despite the general agreement that inter-
est analysis of some sort is preferable to vested rights, the agreement ends 
there, as interest analysis has, since Currie, come in a variety of flavors that 
would do Baskin-Robbins proud.48 
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws was finalized in 197149 
in a world of broad agreement that the first Restatement needed to be repu-
diated;50 however, there was only marginal consensus on what should replace 
it. The ultimate product has thus understandably been criticized as “mush”51 
                                                                                                                         
45 See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 1380 (describing Brainerd Currie’s articles from 
1958 onward as “the weapons of legal realism … brought fully to bear on the problems of 
choice of law.”); Giesela Rühl, Methods and Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 801, 823 (2006) (calling Currie’s governmental 
interest analysis the “most influential approach that arose in the course of the American 
conflicts revolution ….”). 
46 Reynolds, supra note 30, at 138182. 
47 Roosevelt, supra note 27, at 2466. 
48 See, e.g., ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 107 (4th ed. 1986) 
(including determination of “the better rule of law” in system of choice-influencing 
considerations); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 35152 
(4th ed. 2001) (emphasizing pragmatic consideration of the consequences of selecting 
particular laws); William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 4142 (1963) (advocating a form of interest analysis weighted toward selection 
of law of the jurisdiction whose policies would be more impaired by rejection). 
49 Prior drafts of this Restatement, however, had been exerting influence for many 
years before 1971. See Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: 
Some Observations and an Empirical Note, 56 MD. L. REV. 1232 (1997) (“In draft form, 
the Second Restatement attracted early attention from courts, including a prominent cita-
tion in the New York Court of Appeals pathbreaking 1963 Babcock v. Jackson decision.”). 
50 Ralph U. Whitten, Curing the Deficiencies of the Conflicts Revolution: A Proposal 
for National Legislation on Choice of Law, Jurisdiction, and Judgments, 37 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 259 (2001) (“There is a general consensus that the ‘conflicts revolution’ has been 
successful in destroying the premises on which the traditional vested rights, or “terri-
torial,” system of conflict of laws was based.”). 
51 Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Consti-
tutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 253 (1992) (describing 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws as trying to be “all things to all people” 
and producing “mush” as a result). 
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and “a confusing morass.”52 Still, in the area of contract law, the Second 
Restatement, particularly its section 187,53 represented a major step toward 
greater party autonomy, certainly as compared to Beale’s Restatement. It au-
thorized such choice within limits. Under section 187, parties to a contract 
are free to choose the law of any state to govern their contractual rights and 
duties unless the state “has no substantial relationship to the parties or the 
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice.”54 
Generally, American courts will honor the selection of non-forum law by 
the parties absent a fairly narrow exception by which the courts will not en-
force law that would be “contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which 
has a materially greater interest than the chosen state” in the issue.55 This 
approach might best be characterized as confined party autonomy. The two 
confining limitations are (1) that the chosen law is not allowed to be one 
with “no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction” and “no 
other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice” and (2) that application of 
the chosen law must not violate a “fundamental policy” of a state with “a 
materially greater interest” than the state whose law is chosen in the contract. 
In the United States, section 187 is today considered “largely representa-
tive of American case law” on the issue of contractual choice of law. 56 
                                                                                                                         
52 Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 731 (1990) 
(observing that Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws has not produced consistency 
in judicial analysis of choice-of-law issues). 
53 In full, section 187 provides: 
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual 
rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the 
parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement 
directed to that issue. 
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual 
rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which 
the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their 
agreement directed to that issue, unless either 
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the 
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties choice, 
or 
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a 
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest 
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and 
which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law 
in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. 
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is 
to the local law of the state of the chosen law. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). 
54 Id. § 187(2)(a) (1971, revised 1988). 
55 Id. § 187(2)(b). 
56 Ronald A. Brand, The Rome I Regulation Rules on Party Autonomy for Choice of Law: 
A U.S. Perspective (U. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2011-29, 
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The Restatement’s allowance of the possibility of parties selecting law 
predicated solely upon a “reasonable basis for the parties’ choice”57 cer-
tainly could be read as allowing significant party autonomy to select law 
unrelated to their transaction. Indeed, the drafters of Revised Article 1 used 
that phrasing from the Restatement as support for proposed section 1-301,58 
noting the comment to section 187 that contracts “are entered into for seri-
ous purposes and rarely, if ever, will the parties choose a law without good 
reason for doing so.”59 Still, the backstop requirement for at least a “rea-
sonable basis” would circumscribe party autonomy, if only due to the in-
herent uncertainty of what a given court might find reasonable. The safer 
selection, in terms of certainty of enforcement, would be the law of a juris-
diction substantially related to either the parties or their transaction. 
Former UCC section 1-105 was, like Restatement section 187, another 
result of the rejection of vested-rights theory. The choice-of-law section in 
the UCC emerged in its first widely adopted form in the 1958 Official Text of 
the Code.60 While the UCC provision seems by its promulgation date to 
predate section 187 of the Restatement (Second),61 both products involved 
the ALI and were born of the “conflicts revolution” that sought both a 
rejection of Beale’s formalism and greater respect for contracting-party 
autonomy in choosing governing law.62 Section 1-105 remained unchanged 
in its basic framework until its—temporary, as it turned out—replacement 
in 2001.63 The core of former section 1-105 provided: 
(1) Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a 
reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the 
                                                                                                                         
Dec. 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/J4RD-B6TH. But see Whitten, supra note 50, at 
260 (“[I]t is generally agreed that the states adopting the Restatement (Second) approach 
do not apply it in the way it was intended by its drafters, or, indeed, in any consistent way 
among themselves.”). 
57 Brand, supra note 56, at 8. 
58 See Memorandum from Boris Auerbach, Neil B. Cohen, & H. Kathleen Patchel on 
Proposed UCC Section 1-301 to Members of the Am. Law Inst. 3 (May 10, 2001), archived 
at http://perma.cc/W3D4-TDC3. 
59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, cmt. F. 
60 See Robert A. Leflar, Conflict of Laws Under the U.C.C., 35 ARK. L. REV. 87, 94 
(1981) (“The 1958 official draft of the Code … put section 1-105 in very nearly its [1981] 
present form,” with amendments being confined to the exceptions in subsection (2) neces-
sitated by revisions of other articles of the Code.). 
61 Despite its 1971 end product, the process of drafting the Second Restatement began 
nearly two decades prior in 1952. See Willis L.M. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Re-
statement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 679, 680 (1963). 
62 Borchers, supra note 49, at 1232 (describing the Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws as the product of a decades-long “conflicts revolution” that replaced formalism). 
63 Compare U.C.C. § 1-105 (1958), with U.C.C. § 1-105 (2000) (containing identical 
text save for certain cross references in section 1-105(2)). 
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parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or 
nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Act 
applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.64 
Thus, parties to a transaction subject to the UCC could contract for the 
law of their choosing, provided that such law bore a “reasonable relation” 
to the transaction. This approach, like that of the Second Restatement, is also 
properly characterized as confined autonomy, even though the confining 
standard is framed differently. One paragraph of the Official Comments was 
devoted to the question of party autonomy, and it “mysteriously”65 suggested 
that a “reasonable relation” did not necessarily mean a relation to the trans-
action: “[A]n agreement as to choice of law may sometimes take effect as 
a shorthand expression of the intent of the parties as to matters governed 
by their agreement, even though the transaction has no significant contact 
with the jurisdiction chosen.”66 The question of where the outer bounds of 
party autonomy lay under former section 1-105 was “unanswered;” however, 
the official comments “suggest[ed] that common sense defines it.”67 As for 
what courts actually did with the potentially broad party autonomy, Robert 
Leflar by 1981 could do no more than predict that “some day, in some courts” 
section 1-105 would “be held to be satisfied simply by the parties’ deliberate 
designation of a relevant law that in their opinion best serves the purposes 
of their voluntary transaction.”68 Judicial interpretation of section 1-105 
                                                                                                                         
64 U.C.C. § 1-105 (2000). Subsection (2), omitted from the main text above, listed excep-
tions to the general rule that largely dealt with the rights of third parties to a transaction: 
(2) Where one of the following provisions of this Act specifies the ap-
plicable law, that provision governs and a contrary agreement is effec-
tive only to the extent permitted by the law (including the conflict of laws 
rules) so specified: 
Rights of creditors against sold goods. Section 2-402. 
Applicability of the Article on Leases. Sections 2A-105 and 2A-106. 
Applicability of the Article on Bank Deposits and Collections. Section 4-
102. 
Governing law in the Article on Funds Transfers. Section 4A-507. 
Letters of Credit. Section 5-116. 
[If Article 6 has not been repealed:] Bulk sales subject to the Article on 
Bulk Sales. Section 6-103. 
Applicability of the Article on Investment Securities. Section 8-110. 
Perfection provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions. Section 9-
103. 
Id. 
65 Thomas G. Ryan, Reasonable Relation and Party Autonomy Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 219, 225 (1979). 
66 U.C.C. § 1-105 cmt. 1 (2000) (emphasis added). 
67 Leflar, supra note 60, at 96. 
68 Id. at 98. 
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could conceivably have permitted the extensive party autonomy that was 
explicitly permitted some two decades later in proposed section 1-301. But as 
Neil Cohen, the reporter for Revised Article 1, suggested in a statement at the 
ALI’s 2001 meeting, such judicial movement had, even by then, not oc-
curred.69 Little had changed from courts limiting their analysis of the rea-
sonable relation limit on choice of law to “the presence of certain geographic 
contacts.”70 The sustained and relatively constrained approach to choice of 
law by courts applying former section 1-105 thus set the stage for a dra-
matically different proposal by the proponents of party autonomy. 
B. Autonomy Ascendant? 
Despite the absence of substantial judicial movement in the United States 
to expand party autonomy under former section 1-105, the concept gained 
momentum internationally. Ultimately, a collection of international norms 
coalesced and found their way into the pro-autonomy arguments that led to 
the promulgation of proposed UCC section 1-301 in 2001. The drafters and 
proponents used international trends toward expanded choice-of-law auton-
omy to craft an argument that not only was such contractual autonomy 
logical as a matter of private ordering, but the UCC had fallen behind the 
times for international business transactions. There had been, in other words, 
“an ubiquitous move toward a general extension of party autonomy as the 
starting point for conflict-of-laws assessment of international situations,” 
and this move was accordingly “accompanied by calls from the ranks of legal 
scholarship for ever-broader expansion,”71 such as that proposed in Revised 
Article 1. 
The three principal examples of “international norms” cited by the 
drafters of Revised Article 172 were (1) the Inter-American Convention on 
the Law Applicable to International Contract, Article 7 (the 1994 “Mexico 
City Convention”);73 (2) the Convention on the Law Applicable to Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods, Article 7(1) (the 1986 “Hague 
                                                                                                                         
69 Discussion of the Uniform Commercial Code, Revised Article 1, 78 A.L.I. PROC. 
427 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 ALI Proceedings] (statement of Prof. Neil B. Cohen) (“Courts 
have done something very interesting with … § 1-105: They have ignored it.”). 
70 Ryan, supra note 65, at 228. 
71 Florian Rödl, Private Law Beyond the Democratic Order? On the Legitimatory 
Problem of Private Law “Beyond the State”, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 743, 753–54 (2008). 
72 U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. 2, ¶ 1 (2003). 
73 Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts art. 7, 
Mar. 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 732, 734 [hereinafter Mexico City Convention], available at 
http://perma.cc/8CV3-HT9C. 
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Convention”);74 and (3) the European Community (EC) Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Article 3(1) (the 1980 “Rome 
I Convention”).75 These three precedents, along with the 2008 European 
Regulation on choice of law that has since replaced the Rome I Conven-
tion, illustrate the strength of the drafters’ contention that sanctioning party 
autonomy had ascended to become not only common, but indeed domi-
nant as a norm in international contracting. 
First, the EC’s Rome I Convention was promulgated in 1980 for the 
purpose, among others, of providing choice-of-law rules for “Contracting 
States” in the EC.76 Because the convention participants drafted it as a Euro-
pean treaty, the then-member nations of the EC were required to ratify 
Rome I before they were bound by it. The Convention was on its face un-
equivocal in mandating respect for party contractual autonomy: “[A] con-
tract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.”77 Moreover, the 
law susceptible to such choice was extensive; it need not have arisen from 
anywhere in the European Union.78 The chosen law did, however, have to 
come from a nation or state, and not from commercial custom or a private 
or intergovernmental organization.79 
Despite its general rule of contracting-party autonomy, the Rome I Con-
vention broadly exempted numerous contracts from such choice. For con-
sumer contracts, contracting parties generally could not select law “depriving 
the consumer of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of 
the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence[.]”80 Em-
ployment contracts similarly required application of protective law of the 
employee’s habitual residence.81 The Convention did not apply at all to many 
classes of contracts, including those relating to wills and succession, marital 
                                                                                                                         
74 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
art. 7(1), Dec. 22, 1986, 24 I.L.M. 1573, 1575 [hereinafter Hague Convention], available 
at http://perma.cc/59SZ-DC8X. 
75 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations art. 3(1), opened for 
signature June 19, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1 [hereinafter Rome I Convention], available 
at http://perma.cc/B4JW-CV9Y. 
76 See id. art. 27. 
77 Id. art. 3(1); see also Friedrich K. Juenger, The Inter-American Convention on the 
Law Applicable to International Contracts: Some Highlights and Comparisons, 42 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 381, 383 (1994) (“The [Rome I] Convention's lodestar is party autonomy.”). 
78 See Rome I Convention, supra note 75, at art. 2 (“Any law specified by this 
Convention shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a Contracting State.”). 
79 See Juenger, supra note 77, at 384 (observing that Rome I Convention allows for 
application of only “the positive laws of particular states and nations” and finding such a 
positivistic limitation to be “a throwback to an earlier age” and “at odds with current 
commercial and judicial practice”). 
80 Rome I Convention, supra note 75, at art. 5(2). 
81 See id. art. 6(1)–6(2)(a). 
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property, child support obligations, arbitration and forum-selection agree-
ments, negotiable instruments (at least as to their negotiable character), 
and insurance contracts.82  
The 1986 Hague Convention, unlike its Rome counterpart, has never 
been adopted by enough nations for it to come into force, but it nonetheless 
supplied another reference point for the drafters of Revised UCC Article 1. 
On its face, this treaty would apply only to contracts for the international 
sale of goods,83 rather than to contracts generally. Even then, it excluded 
from its scope contracts for “sales of goods bought for personal, family or 
household use” unless the seller neither “knew nor ought to have known” 
of the buyer’s consumer status.84 The Hague Convention generally permit-
ted contracting parties to stipulate the applicable law,85 provided that the 
chosen law would allow such a stipulation.86 Upon reaching litigation, 
however, the parties’ selected law would be disregarded to the extent it 
conflicted with mandatory rules of the forum in which their dispute was 
pending.87 The forum could further pare back the parties’ choice of law to 
the extent application of such law “would be manifestly incompatible with 
public policy.”88 
The Mexico City Convention of 1994, intended for ratification by nations 
in the Western Hemisphere who are members of the Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS),89 also built from a basic premise of party autonomy in 
contractual choice of law. The regional OAS effort was inspired, in notable 
                                                                                                                         
82 See generally id. art. 1 (stating the scope of the treaty’s applicability). 
83 Despite their similar-sounding names, the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods should not be confused with the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna 1980). The 
not-in-force Hague Convention deals entirely with choice-of-law rules, while the in-force 
United Nations CISG is a code of substantive law that applies to many international sales 
contracts. See generally Larry A. DiMatteo et. al., The Interpretive Turn in International 
Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 
299, 308 (2004) (describing the CISG as an international sales law code). 
84 Hague Convention, supra note 74, at art. 2(c). 
85 See id. art. 7(1). 
86 See id. art. 10(1). 
87 See id. art. 17 (“This Convention does not prevent the application of those provisions 
of the law of the forum that must be applied irrespective of the law that otherwise governs 
the contract.”). 
88 Id. art. 18. 
89 As of this writing, the Mexico City Convention has not come into effect because it 
has been ratified only by Mexico and Venezuela. See Signatories and Ratifications, Inter-
American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts, available at 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-56.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived 
at https://perma.cc/3VLR-ND9Y?type=source; see also Charles R. Calleros, Toward Harmo-
nization and Certainty in Choice-of-Law Rules for International Contracts: Should the 
U.S. Adopt the Equivalent of Rome I?, 28 WIS. INT'L L.J. 639, 658-59 (2011). 
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part, by the experience of the Rome I Convention for Europe.90 If the 
parties provided for choice of law, then “[t]he contract shall be governed” 
by such law, with the exception of mandatory requirements, and it would 
be “up to the forum to decide” which of its laws qualified as “mandatory 
provisions.”91 This ability for each forum to select individual rules as 
mandatory, however, was not new to the Mexico City Convention, as it also 
was drawn from the Rome I Convention.92  
Those three sources, then, were the “international norms” available to 
and cited as support by the drafters of proposed UCC section 1-301. But the 
rise of autonomy continued even well afterward. In 2008, the original Rome I 
Convention described above was superseded by the “Rome I Regulation.” 
The Regulation was an enactment of the European Parliament, not a treaty. 
Unlike its predecessor, the Regulation mandated that it “shall be applied 
whether or not it is the law of a [European Union] Member State.”93 The 
prefatory recitals to the Regulation showed that this body of law not only 
supported contractual party autonomy, but relied on it as a foundational 
principle:  “The parties’ freedom to choose the applicable law should be 
one of the cornerstones of the system of conflict-of-law rules in matters of 
contractual obligations.”94 Furthermore, while the Rome I Convention al-
lowed only for “a choice between the laws of different countries,”95 its 
replacement Regulation applied across the board to “contractual obligations 
in civil and commercial matters.”96 Parties could thus choose non-state 
laws, such as model laws or UNIDROIT Principles.97 
Thus, the “international norms” claimed by the drafters of Revised UCC 
Article 1 strongly show today—as they did in 2001—a trend toward gen-
erally unlimited party autonomy in contractual choice of law in the non-
consumer context. In significant part, cognizance of this trend led the ULC 
and the ALI to approve what became proposed UCC section 1-301. It fit 
the arc of legal history. The first Restatement of Conflict of Laws, which 
                                                                                                                         
90 See Juenger, supra note 77, at 382 (finding that Rome I Convention “served as a 
model for our hemisphere's drafters”). 
91 Mexico City Convention, supra note 73, at arts. 7 & 11. 
92 See Juenger, supra  note 77, at 392 (“Like article 7(1) of the Rome Convention, 
article 11 of the Mexico City Convention authorizes decisionmakers to take into account 
not only the forum’s ‘mandatory’ rules of decision but also strongly held policies of a 
foreign legal system with which the contract has close ties. This would include, e.g., a 
third state’s antitrust laws or consumer legislation.”). 
93 Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6, 
10 [hereinafter Rome I Regulation], available at http://perma.cc/R8S6-N93S.  
94 Id. ¶ (11) (emphasis added). 
95 Rome I Convention, supra note 75, at art. 1(1). 
96 Rome I Regulation, supra note 93, at art. 1(1). 
97 See Juenger, supra note 77, at 384. 
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rejected autonomy, had given way to former UCC section 1-105 and section 
187 of the Restatement (Second), both of which sanctioned party autonomy 
to contractually choose governing law within stated (albeit amorphous) 
limits. In the realm of international contracts, treaties pushed the concept fur-
ther, containing no general limits analogous to a “reasonable relation” 
standard, yet subjecting most consumer contracts to mandatory rules. Au-
tonomy certainly seemed ascendant as Revised UCC Article 1 was drafted 
and promulgated. 
II. THE PROMULGATION AND NOT-QUITE ADOPTION OF UCC ARTICLE 1 
In many respects, the drafting and ultimate promulgation of Revised 
Article 1 in 2001 was no different than the long line of successes that had 
been a hallmark of the creation and updating of the UCC. Drafting occurred 
over a multiyear period and was the subject of substantial deliberation and 
debate by members of both the ALI and the ULC. The ultimate outcome, 
however, stands unique in the history of the UCC as having been an over-
whelming political success—the states having widely adopted Revised 
Article 198—simultaneously mingled with the unanimous99 political failure 
of proposed section 1-301. While discussions during the drafting process 
previewed the controversy over choice of law, few would have guessed the 
extent to which the concept of unbounded choice of law would face rejection. 
A. The Drafting Process 
According to prominent members of the drafting committee, “[t]he Ar-
ticle 1 revision process began with a report from an American Bar Associa-
tion Task Force to the Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC recommending 
certain substantive revisions to Article 1. The Article 1 Committee was ap-
pointed in 1996.”100 By November 1999, the Committee had completed a 
“Council Draft” for discussion at the following month’s meeting of the Coun-
cil of the ALI.101 This draft of Revised Article 1, while not the earliest one, 
appeared far enough into the process that debate on choice of law crystalized 
over the following two years. Consistent with other versions, it contained 
                                                                                                                         
98 See Rowley, supra note 12, at 13. 
99 Unanimous, that is, as to the fifty United States. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Harmo-
nizing Choice of Law in Article 9 with Emerging International Norms, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 
235, 247 (2011) (describing the rejection of proposed section 1-301 as being “[w]ith the 
negligible exception of the U.S. Virgin Islands”). 
100 Kathleen Patchel & Boris Auerbach, The Article 1 Revision Process, 54 SMU L. 
REV. 603 (2001). Kathleen Patchel was the Associate Reporter for the Article 1 Drafting 
Committee and Boris Auerbach was the Committee Chair. 
101 U.C.C. Art. 1 (Council Draft, 1999). 
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what the Committee called “significant changes” to the then-existing Arti-
cle 1 scheme for choice of law.102 
Structurally, the choice-of-law provision was moved from section 1-
105 and renumbered as section 1-301,103 a reorganization that was part of 
a larger goal of making Article 1 more user-friendly.104 The Committee 
sought to place all rules of interpretation in the 1-100 series (Part 1) and 
definitions and related provisions in the 1-200s (Part 2), while substantive 
rules applicable throughout the Code became the new 1-300 sections.105 
From the drafters’ perspective, new section 1-301 was the “most significant 
change to Article 1,” so it was an appropriate choice to lead off the series of 
ten substantive provisions contained in Part 3. Although section 1-301 under-
went several changes following the 1999 Council Draft,106 the overall struc-
ture of Revised Article 1 remained unchanged through its final approval by 
ALI and ULC. 
The prefatory note to the 1999 Council Draft prepared by the reporter, 
Professor Neil Cohen, opened by summarizing the new statute’s purpose as to 
allow “broad autonomy, with several important limitations” on choice of law 
in transactions within the scope of the UCC.107 This autonomy included the 
ability to choose law “even if the transaction bears no relation to the State [of 
the United States] or country whose law is selected.”108 The Reporter’s Note 
also identified domestic and international precedents for section 1-301.109 
The Code itself had previously allowed broad choice of law for funds 
transfers (Article 4A), letters of credit (Article 5), and investment securities 
(Article 8).110 The funds transfer article expressly authorized the choice of 
law “whether or not that law bears a reasonable relation to the matter in 
issue,”111 while the letters of credit article similarly provided that the law 
                                                                                                                         
102 Id. § 1-301 reporter’s note. 
103 Earlier and less widely circulated drafts of Revised Article 1 numbered the pro-
vision as section 1-302, while the scope of Article 1 was described in section 1-301. See, 
e.g., U.C.C. § 1-302 (Discussion Draft, 1997). When the “Scope of Article” section was 
moved out of Part 3 and into section 1-102 in Part 1, the choice of law provision became 
section 1-301. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-301 (Council Draft, 1999). 
104 See Patchel & Auerbach, supra note 100, at 605. 
105 See id. 
106  Compare U.C.C. Art. 1 (Council Draft, 1999), with U.C.C. Art. 1 (2001) (placing the 
Article 1 choice-of-law statute at section 1-301 in both instances). 
107 U.C.C. § 1-301 reporter’s note a (Council Draft, 1999). 
108 Id. 
109 See id.; supra text accompanying notes 72–97 (describing “international norms” 
referred to by the drafters). 
110  U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. 2 (2001) (asserting that recognition of party autonomy with 
respect to governing law had been established in Articles 4A, 5, and 8 prior to the 2001 
revision of Article 1). 
111 U.C.C. § 4A-507(c) (2012). 
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chosen “need not bear any relation to the transaction.”112 The investment 
securities article did not, in contrast, explicitly disclaim a reasonable rela-
tionship limitation on choice of law, but allowed for similar autonomy 
through a provision giving discretion to securities issuers to “specify the 
law of another jurisdiction,” for various rights and duties related to the 
security.113 Notably, the two provisions clearly disclaiming the reasonable 
relation standard applied to transactions that are less common and less fa-
miliar among the general public: wire transfers and letters of credit.114 Arti-
cle 1 was more “ubiquitous” and widely applicable, and thus more likely 
to attract broad attention and debate.115 
Following the 1999 Council Draft, there was “extensive discussion at 
the December 1999 meeting of the Council, the 2000 Annual Meeting of 
the ALI, and the 2000 Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws.”116 The proposals regarding choice of 
law “were the subject of more extensive Drafting Committee analysis and 
deliberation than any other topic.”117 
Subsequent discussion of proposed section 1-301 was likewise extensive 
and occasionally heated. Given the later unfavorable response by the states 
to proposed section 1-301, one might assume that deliberation centered on 
questions of whether the drafters had gone too far with party autonomy. 
Many complaints at the ALI Annual Meeting in May 2000, however, sug-
gested the opposite. Practitioners with an international focus went so far as 
to suggest the statute was “potentially offensive” to other nations.118 The 
concept of purely domestic United States transactions being limited to choos-
ing the law of an American state was called, by more than one speaker, 
“xenophobic.”119 
                                                                                                                         
112 Id. § 5-116(a). 
113 See id. § 8-110(d). 
114 See id. § 4A-507(c) & 5-116(a). 
115 See Rowley, supra note 12, at 1 (“Because the provisions of Article 1 apply to the 
entire Code, the impact of decisions regarding what provisions it includes is greater than 
that for decisions regarding provisions in individual articles …. The ubiquitous nature of 
Article 1 justifies attention to its revision.”). 
116 U.C.C. § 1 memorandum to council at xiv (Council Draft No. 2, 2000). 
117 Id. at xiii. 
118 Discussion of the Uniform Commercial Code, Revised Article 1, 77 A.L.I. PROC. 
258 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 ALI Proceedings] (statement of John K. Lawrence) (“I 
would appreciate the advice of the Reporter as to why it was felt necessary to exclude the 
choice of foreign governing law if it were a purely domestic transaction. It seems to me 
that that is potentially offensive to other countries, because it seems to suggest we don’t 
regard their law as an appropriate choice under particular circumstances.”). 
119 E.g., id. at 260 (statement of Thomas Woodward Houghton) (“I strongly urge the 
[American Law] Institute to dissent from this provision. It is xenophobic; it is contrary to 
current practice. I have worked on matters involving oil and gas interests in Indonesia that 
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When Council Draft No. 2 came out later that year, the drafters de-
fended the proposal from the critics contending it did not go far enough. 
The cover memo accompanying the draft included a ringing endorsement of 
contracting parties’ right to choose law of a jurisdiction with no relation-
ship to the transaction.120 The 2000 Draft and its successors thus contained 
definitions for a “domestic transaction”121 and an “international transac-
tion”122 and used them to state what had been implied: if a non-consumer 
transaction bore any reasonable relationship to a country outside the United 
States, then the parties could choose the law of any state or nation to gov-
ern.123 The prefatory note to the 2000 Draft also credited it as following 
“emerging international norms,”124 presumably insulating the drafters from 
further charges of xenophobia. 
At the 2001 Annual Meeting of the ALI, discussion of Revised Article 1 
continued to be dominated by choice of law, much of the discussion arising in 
the context of two motions that opposed certain aspects of the extension of 
party autonomy. The first motion by Professor Jay Westbrook sought to re-
commit Article 1 for one more year of consideration. Though Westbrook 
supported greater party autonomy in concept, he found that the as-proposed 
version of section 1-301 undermined the role of state legislatures: “[t]he 
real point is the mandatory rules that democratically elected legislatures in 
the states … that those rules can be completely overridden by an ungoverned 
party autonomy, and that is the problem, it is an ungoverned party autonomy. 
There is no reasonableness formulation; there is no limitation whatsoever.”125 
The Drafting Committee opposed the Westbrook motion, in part, by 
appealing to section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.126 
                                                                                                                         
chose the law of Alberta. It is routine for people who are in different countries to choose the 
law of a jurisdiction that is neutral.”); see also id. at 258 (statement of Houston Putnam 
Lowry) (describing the exclusion of foreign law from a transaction “having no reasonable 
relationship ‘to any country other than the United States’” as being “xenophobic”). 
120 See U.C.C. § 1 memorandum to council at xv (Council Draft No. 2, 2000) (“[T]his 
section [1-301] was misinterpreted by some commentators as allowing only the 
designation of the law of a foreign country to which the transaction bore some relation 
and was criticized as ‘xenophobic’ for that limitation. This draft is restructured to make it 
clear that limitation is not present.”) 
121 U.C.C. § 1-301(a)(1) (2003) (“‘Domestic transaction’ means a transaction other 
than an international transaction.”). 
122 Id. § 1-301(a)(2) (“‘International transaction’ means a transaction that bears a 
reasonable relation to a country other than the United States.”). 
123 Compare id., with U.C.C. § 1-301(a) (Council Draft No. 2, 2000). 
124 U.C.C. § 1, memorandum to council at xxii (Council Draft No. 2, 2000). 
125 2001 ALI Proceedings, supra note 69, at 442–43 (statement of Jay L. Westbrook). 
126 See “Proposed UCC Section 1-301” Memorandum from Boris Auerbach, Neil B. 
Cohen, & H. Kathleen Patchel to Members of the Am. Law Inst. ¶ 2 (May 10, 2001) (on 
file with the ALI), available at http://perma.cc/HPF7-NGVH. 
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To the committee, the UCC proposal was close to the Restatement, which 
it asserted “upholds the designation of the law of a jurisdiction to which 
the transaction does not bear a reasonable relation so long as there is a ‘rea-
sonable basis for the parties’ choice’” of law for their contract.127 Moreover, 
states would still have the ability to govern private contracts through the 
ability to refuse to enforce law that violates “fundamental policy” of the 
state.128 Section 1-301 was not, in the committee’s words, “an antidemocratic 
break with the past ….”129 
The second motion, by Professor William Woodward, sought to retain 
the reasonable relation rule from original Article 1 for domestic contracts 
while still eliminating it from international contracts. Woodward argued 
that “this is a place where we ought to go slowly” and “if this rule generates 
no problems at the international level ... we might import it domestically.”130 
One market-based argument by proponents of expansive party autonomy, 
as described by Woodward, was that extensive autonomy would encourage 
states to “begin diversifying their law so that people would pick their law 
rather than ... the law of some other state.”131 Woodward criticized this view 
by observing that it “almost defies the whole idea of lawmaking itself.”132 
Both the Westbrook motion and the Woodward motion were ultimately 
defeated, and Revised Article 1—including section 1-301—was approved. 
From the perspective of party autonomy, the heart of promulgated sec-
tion 1-301 was its subsection (c). There, the UCC explicitly rejected the 
reasonable relation limitation on contractual choice of law. Apart from 
exceptions stated elsewhere, it set up two general rules: 
(1) an agreement by parties to a domestic transaction that any or all of 
their rights and obligations are to be determined by the law of this State 
or of another State is effective, whether or not the transaction bears a 
relation to the State designated; and 
                                                                                                                         
127 See Memorandum from Boris Auerbach, Neil B. Cohen, & H. Kathleen Patchel on 
the Motion of Professor Jay L. Westbrook to Members of the Am. Law Inst. ¶ 9 (May 10, 
2001) (on file with the ALI), available at http://www.ali.org/ali_old/2001_Reporters 
_M3.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/47ZX-FBWU (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 187(2)(a)). The committee arguably over-
stated the level of autonomy provided by the Restatement, as it provides that the parties’ 
chosen law will not apply if “the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or 
the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 187(2)(a) (1971). The use of “other reasonable basis” seems 
to have operated more as an extraordinary fallback position rather than as a commonly 
invoked rule.  
128 Memorandum from Boris Auerbach et al., supra note 127, at ¶ 2. 
129 See id. at ¶ 6. 
130 2001 ALI Proceedings, supra note 69, at 512 (statement by Prof. William J. 
Woodward, Jr.). 
131 Id. at 514. 
132 Id. 
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(2) an agreement by parties to an international transaction that any or 
all of their rights are to be determined by the law of this State or of an-
other State or country is effective, whether or not the transaction bears 
a relation to the State or country designated.133 
The UCC defined a “domestic transaction” as “a transaction other than 
an international transaction,” while an “international transaction” broadly 
encompassed any transaction that “bears a reasonable relation to a country 
other than the United States.”134 Thus, a contract between two American 
contracting parties could quite plausibly be an “international transaction” 
if it had some discernable foreign component. 
The approved version of section 1-301 had nearly 4,500 words of official 
comments accompanying it, a size that, while not completely unprecedented, 
certainly stood out as being on the long side. The extensive comments can 
best be read as a response to both prior and anticipated critics of the “signif-
icant rethinking of choice of law issues.”135 One notable feature of the com-
ments is the extent to which they emphasized the lack of party autonomy. 
Consumer transactions required application of the “relevant consumer 
protection rules ... of the consumer’s home jurisdiction.”136 In business-to-
business transactions that were wholly domestic (that is, not bearing “a 
reasonable relation to a country other than the United States”), the chosen law 
could only be that of an American state. All transactions would be subject 
to the “important safeguard” of an exception where no jurisdiction would 
be required to apply law “contrary to a fundamental policy” of that juris-
diction.137 The drafters cited the oft-used statement from Judge Cardozo’s 
1918 opinion in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York,138 as a “helpful 
touchstone” for when this exception would apply, though the opinion was 
most noteworthy for emphasizing the rarity of the actual existence of a 
choice-negating policy,139 and providing little guidance on garden-variety 
conflicts issues.140 Finally, the drafters emphasized the limited extent to 
which section 1-301 would apply at all. For the section to be effective, a 
transaction would have to be (1) within the scope of the UCC and also 
                                                                                                                         
133 U.C.C. § 1-301(c) (2003). 
134 Id. § 1-301(a). 
135 Id. § 1-301 cmt. 1 at ¶ 1. 
136 Id. at ¶ 3. 
137 Id. at ¶ 5. 
138 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198 (N.Y. 1918). 
139 See id. at 202 (“The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the 
pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency or fairness.”). 
140 See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 1378 (observing that a “public policy” exception 
“makes good sense when dealing with the laws of Nazi Germany, of course, but what about 
the laws of Connecticut?”). 
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(2) not otherwise controlled by choice of law rules in a specific article of 
the code—such provisions appearing in Articles 2, 2A, 4, 4A, 5, 8, and 9, 
and even in the widely repealed Article 6 on Bulk Sales.141 
Given these significant exceptions to the actual application of proposed 
section 1-301, one might fairly wonder why either its supporters or their 
opponents would be invested in its promulgation at all. Would it truly 
matter? Less substance was at stake in the debate, I suggest, than the pri-
macy of a view of what law is. Proposed section 1-301 ran too far contrary 
to the American view of legal legitimacy—and it did so in too prominent 
of a manner to ultimately succeed. Nonetheless, the concept behind less-
anchored party autonomy had some powerful arguments in its favor. 
B. The Pro-Autonomy Case 
Many scholars, both before and after the promulgation of Revised Ar-
ticle 1, characterized the greater party autonomy of the sort contained in 
proposed section 1-301 as imminently sensible, with opposition to the project 
as backward. William Henning, who was heavily involved in the revision 
process for Articles 2 and 2A during the drafting of Revised Article 1,142 
characterized proposed section 1-301 as having “represented a significant 
advance in the law” and charged that “its opponents never articulated a com-
pelling, or even a particularly coherent, argument against it.”143 Nonethe-
less, these opponents were “able to block its enactment .…”144 Before turning 
to proposed section 1-301’s rejection by the states, consideration of the 
underlying arguments favoring party autonomy is in order. 
The notion of treating contract law different from, say, tort or criminal 
law, arises from the fact that contracts are essentially a private ordering of 
transactional obligations rather than a matter of public interest. Choosing 
law is thus no different from the voluntary decision to be bound by a contract 
in the first place. Proponents of choice-of-law autonomy thus find it foun-
dational that “in the absence of third-party effects, the parties to the trans-
action should be permitted to choose the applicable law through contract” 
                                                                                                                         
141 U.C.C. § 1-301(g) (2003) (cataloging choice-of-law provisions that would 
supersede section 1-301). 
142 Professor Henning was a member of the Committee to Revise Uniform Commercial 
Code U.C.C. Article 2–Sales from 1996 to 1999, chaired the reconstituted Committee to 
Amend Uniform Commercial Code U.C.C. Article 2–Sales and Article 2A–Leases from 
1999 to 2001, and was Executive Director of the ULC (then the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) when amended Articles 2 and 2A were promul-
gated in 2003. William H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong?, 11 DUQ. 
BUS. L.J. 131, 131 n.1 (2009). 
143 See id. at 141. 
144 Id. at 142. 
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without reference to any limiting test.145 In this view, law is not and should 
not be different from any negotiated and fully private contract term: let 
law be part of a marketplace.146 
Connected to this concept of law as a marketplace commodity, autonomy 
proponents have further suggested that free choice of law is, through com-
petition, likely to promote more efficient laws in each jurisdiction.147 From 
a law-and-economics perspective, “private parties are assumed to engage 
in transactions only when it is in their interest to do so” and their transac-
tions “will be both welfare-increasing and value-maximizing.”148 These 
value-maximizing parties should, as a result, be allowed “to maximize 
their return … by selecting the legal regime that is best suited to their 
needs.”149 The experience of international commercial law also suggests 
several reasonable grounds for supporting greater party autonomy in choice 
of law for non-consumer transactions.150 From this perspective, the princi-
pal problem with proposed section 1-301 is that it did not go far enough. 
Two American contracting parties in a wholly domestic transaction, for ex-
ample, should be able to select the law of the Cayman Islands but would 
not have been allowed such a choice. Contracting parties can have legiti-
mate and non-mischievous reasons to wish to apply unrelated law. The par-
ties may want a neutral jurisdiction’s law to apply so that neither side has a 
real or perceived hometown advantage.151 Unrelated law may be better 
                                                                                                                         
145 Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883, 913 (2002). 
146 See ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 15 (2009) (advo-
cating contractual choice-of-law autonomy as a means of creating a “law market” where 
parties could ultimately choose whether their transaction is bound by “quasi-mandatory” 
rules). Notably, O’Hara and Ribstein suggest that such a market could go well beyond 
contract law. See, e.g., id. at 11 (“Despite the difficulties these issues present, enabling a 
full-fledged market in marriage laws has potential value.”). 
147 See, e.g., Erin Ann O’Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of 
Contractual Choice of Law, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1551, 1570 (2000) (describing the market-
efficiency argument and its proponents); Michael J. Whincop & Mary E. Keyes, Statutes’ 
Domains in Private International Law: An Economic Theory of the Limits of Mandatory 
Rules (August 1998) at 12, available at http://perma.cc/HY45-8XVX (“Mandatory rules 
increase the costs associated with inefficient selection of terms by lawmakers where party 
preferences vary. [F]ew laws are completely mandatory—parties may reorder their trans-
actions in a way that makes application of the laws of a disfavoured system unlikely.”).  
148 Guzman, supra note 145, at 913–14. 
149 Id. at 914. 
150 See generally Jack M. Graves, Party Autonomy in Choice of Commercial Law: The 
Failure of Revised U.C.C. § 1-301 and a Proposal for Broader Reform, 36 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 59 (2005). 
151 Id. at 75 (“In fact, a choice of law, other than the seller’s own law, might well be 
fairer to all of the parties involved.”). For a rather extreme but entertaining story of the 
mischief of which parties are capable when they can have complete control of their 
governing law, see James Grimmelmann, Sealand, Havenco, and the Rule of Law, 2012 
U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 412–37 (describing the “stranger than fiction” creation and operation 
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developed, such as in the cases of Delaware corporate law or English mari-
time law. In a world of ever-increasing international commerce, the desire 
for American law to be “consistent with international norms”152 reflected 
by the European Union, China, and international trade treaties is certainly 
non-frivolous.153 As previously noted, consideration of international com-
mercial practices was prominent in the advocacy for section 1-301 during the 
deliberations leading up to its promulgation.154  
A particularly compelling substantive argument in favor of party au-
tonomy is the already-existing extent of such choice by means of contrac-
tual arbitration clauses.155 Under the Federal Arbitration Act, parties who 
wish to do so can avoid the substantive law of any jurisdiction with only the 
narrowest of exceptions.156 Thus, the argument suggests, those who op-
pose permitting wide-ranging choice of law on the grounds of protecting state 
sovereignty are fighting a losing battle. The incentive already exists for 
parties to escape the laws of their sovereign through arbitration. An arbi-
trator is able to enforce the law of an unrelated jurisdiction in a way that the 
sovereign’s courts could not do given the restrictions of the reasonable-
relation rule for contractual choice of law.157 Recognition of party auton-
omy in the judicial system would reduce the incentives for parties to turn 
to arbitration in order to get their desired system of law. Given the judicial 
notion of comity, courts applying the law of another jurisdiction “are in a 
better position to protect state sovereignty,” and, if the reasonable-relation 
requirement is removed, “can do so in ways that will not necessarily drive 
parties desiring autonomy in choice of law away from court adjudication.”158 
                                                                                                                         
of the “Principality of Sealand” on abandoned World War II antiaircraft platform seven 
miles off British coast). 
152 Proposed U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. 2. 
153 Graves, supra note 150, at 102–03 (citing Inter-American Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Int’l Contracts, Mar. 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 733 and Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1, 19 I.L.M. 
1492); see also Mo Zhang, Party Autonomy and Beyond: An International Perspective of 
Contractual Choice of Law, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 511, 516 (2006) (concluding that 
the dominant international perspective is that “party autonomy deserves full respect and 
need not have a relation base” with law selected by the parties). 
154 See Thomas Woodward Houghton, 78th Annual Meeting: 2001 Proceedings, 78 A.L.I. 
PROC. 520 (2001) (“[T]his Institute is reinventing itself, so that it is no longer simply an 
American Law Institute, but it is an institute that is concerned with the law generally and 
not just in the United States.”). 
155 Graves, supra note 150, at 80–82. 
156 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10–11 (2012) (stating nonsubstantive grounds upon which arbitra-
tion award may be judicially vacated or modified); Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 
576, 592 (2008) (holding that grounds stated for vacatur in section 10 of Federal Arbitration 
Act section 10 and for modification in section 11 of Federal Arbitration Act are exclusive). 
157 Graves, supra note 150, at 85. 
158 Id. at 87. 
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Though not necessarily intuitive, these arguments were (and still are) 
persuasive to many. Unrestricted choice of law is more consistent with 
the private and voluntary nature of contractual obligations, precisely as it is 
less consistent with the norm of law being generally applicable because it 
resides in the public sphere. Contractual choice of law can enable parties 
to make more economically efficient decisions and drive competing juris-
dictions to improve their legal rules. It promotes international trade by 
making the United States’ conflict-of-laws framework more consistent with 
the dominant approach of other nations. Finally, the substance of unre-
stricted contractual choice of law already exists in the United States via the 
Federal Arbitration Act. The academic argument sounds not only promis-
ing but indeed overwhelming, and it makes subsequent failure of pro-
posed section 1-301 all the more worth careful evaluation. 
C. Political Reaction 
Following the success of proposed section 1-301 in gaining approval 
from both the ULC and the ALI, its fate after 2001 was dismal, and it stands 
in striking contrast to success of Revised Article 1. What happened? State 
legislative history of the enactments of Revised Article 1 between 2001 and 
2008 is frequently not extensive, and successful efforts to thwart section 1-
301 by replacing it could, in some circumstances, even predate a proposed 
bill.159 But the record does show some procedural commonalities. 
Texas was one of the first states to consider legislation adopting Revised 
Article 1, and it did so with the as-proposed version of section 1-301 al-
ready stripped from the bill and replaced.160 The official bill analysis pre-
pared from the as-introduced version of Revised Article 1 spoke of the 
Texas legislature’s past record of “expanding party autonomy” but none-
theless retained the reasonable relation test of original section 1-105 because 
it “provides protection both for small businesses and consumers.”161 A later 
bill analysis described the decision to keep prior choice-of-law language 
as preserving a “workable standard for choice of law among states.” More-
over, “[i]f parties were allowed to choose any state law to govern an agree-
ment with no regard to whether the transaction was related reasonably to 
that state, Texas courts increasingly would be burdened by the requirement 
                                                                                                                         
159 See Boris Auerbach, 85th Annual Meeting: 2008 Proceedings, 85 A.L.I. PROC. 303 
(recounting Revised Article 1 proponents’ use of a “hip pocket” amendment on choice of law 
in states “where it was clear that Article 1 revisions simply were not going to go forward”). 
160 H. Comm. on Bus. & Indus., B. Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1394, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003), 
available at http://perma.cc/GHB8-XFJT.  
161 Id.  
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to apply foreign law if litigation resulted from the agreement.”162 The stated 
rationale in Texas, one of the first states to adopt Revised Article 1, was 
thus a reluctance to tamper with what was working and a concern for burden 
on the judiciary. 
 The California version of the bill initially tracked the uniform proposal, 
but the modified choice-of-law statute was ultimately “amended out of the 
bill by the author” on the basis of unspecified concerns “raised by the busi-
ness community.”163 Hawaii’s experience was similar and likewise resulted 
in an amendment to the original bill. 164 California and Hawaii both reflect 
lobbying against the bill. Statements that the existing law was fine were 
largely conclusory. 
For shedding light on why proposed section 1-301 was rejected, the Con-
necticut experience is especially instructive. Connecticut House Bill 6985, 
considered in 2005, did indeed contain section 1-301 as promulgated by its 
drafters. The choice-of-law provision drew a powerful objection in a pub-
lic hearing before the legislature’s Judiciary Committee from the Property 
Casualty Insurer’s Association of America (PCI).165 Connecticut is well-
known as a center of the insurance industry, and PCI presented itself as “a 
property and casualty insurance trade association representing over 1,000 
members” nationwide.166 A collection of over 1,000 insurance companies 
is of a size and political influence that would be difficult for any legislature 
to ignore, and probably more so in Connecticut.167 
PCI’s representative, Jay Jackson, focused on section 13(c), the choice-
of-law provision of the bill, as the only concern of his members. He began 
by emphasizing—not consumer issues or transactional costs—but the 
simple fact that a contract could choose law “whether or not the transac-
tion bears a relationship to the state or country.”168 Like any professional 
                                                                                                                         
162 H. Research Org., B. Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1394, 78th Leg., R.S. (Apr. 14, 2003), 
available at http://perma.cc/66SS-WEPJ.  
163 Cal. S. Judiciary Comm. Rep. on SB 1481 as Amended (May 9, 2006), available 
at http://perma.cc/SZ4G-FL9E. 
164 See, e.g., Haw. H.R. Rep. of the Comm. on Consumer Protection and Commerce 
on H.B. No. 1259 (2004) (attributing objections by Hawaii Bankers Association as the 
principal reason for deleting proposed section 1-301 and retaining “reasonable relation” 
requirement for choice of law), available at http://perma.cc/Y3MU-LMUM.  
165 Conn. Judiciary Comm. Transcript (Apr. 12, 2005) (statement of Jay Jackson, attorney 
representing the Property and Casualty Insurers Association of America), available at 
http://perma.cc/UH7X-VBEN.  
166 Id.  
167 Hartford, Connecticut has, for example, been nicknamed the “Insurance Capital of the 
World” and Hartford houses many of the world's insurance company headquarters. According 
to Forbes magazine, insurance remains that region's major industry. See FORBES HARTFORD, 
CT., archived at http://perma.cc/LS63-TTZK (Forbes profile of Hartford, CT). 
168 Conn. Judiciary Comm. Transcript, supra note 165. 
2015] TOO CLEVER BY HALF 385 
advocate, an industry lobbyist would want to lead off with his strongest 
point, and Mr. Jackson succeeded here. This focus on the lack of relation-
ship between the parties’ transaction and their governing law is designed to 
provoke a visceral reaction. How on earth can parties do something like 
that? Undecided members of the committee could well have discomfort 
nagging them already. 
At first, PCI’s objection seems counterintuitive because it suggests that 
the parties disadvantaged by greater autonomy in contractual choice of law 
would be “Connecticut businesses.”169 In fact, if any business has the ability 
to benefit from wide-open selection of law, it would be an industry that relies 
heavily on adhesion contracts, as insurers do. Few parties would be better 
positioned than an insurer to choose the most favorable law for their con-
tracts if the law permitted them to do so. 
Nonetheless, even if one is cynical and reads “property and casualty 
insurers” in place of “Connecticut businesses” as the disadvantaged party 
in Mr. Jackson’s warning, he is likely correct. Most mainstream insurance 
policies are designed as a defined but broad blanket of coverage where the 
insurer avoids financially unacceptable known risks by coverage exclusion.170 
Where coverage provisions are uncertain or ambiguous, they are construed 
against the insurer.171 What unlimited choice of law does, then, to risk-averse 
insurers, is introduce a largely unknown and (perhaps worse) unquantifiable 
risk into their equations. 
That, then, is financial incentive for insurers to oppose proposed sec-
tion 1-301. Mr. Jackson raised other, more populist points that have some 
persuasive value, even if they do not ring quite as true for his industry 
client. Connecticut businesses should have “the protections felt necessary 
by Connecticut lawmakers who enacted statutes governing business trans-
actions.”172 Adhesion contracts were also a concern, as “many electronic 
contracts or standard form contracts are drafted by a licensor that unilater-
ally determines its terms and conditions.”173 The concerns about the state 
legislature preserving its role in protecting its citizens would be persuasive 
to state legislators, but the concern about form contracts does not quite 
                                                                                                                         
169 Id. 
170 See William E. O'Neil, Insuring Contractual Indemnity Agreements Under CGL, 
MGL, and P & I Policies, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 359, 371 (1997) (describing liability insurance 
as a “broad grant of coverage” subject to specified exclusions). 
171 See John Randolph Prince, III, Where No Minds Meet: Insurance Policy Interpre-
tation and the Use of Drafting History, 18 VT. L. REV. 409, 416 (1994) (describing the contra 
preferentem canon of construction whereby “insurance contracts are to be interpreted against 
their drafters, who are usually members of insurance trade association committees.”); see 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979). 
172 Conn. Judiciary Comm. Transcript, supra note 165. 
173 Id.  
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ring true. The insurance industry, after all, is built upon the use of relatively 
consistent form contracts. 
Mr. Jackson’s final entry in his parade of horribles arose from the area 
of software licensing: Connecticut businesses might find themselves gov-
erned by the software-vendor friendly Uniform Computer Information 
Transaction Act (UCITA), a uniform law enacted only in Maryland and 
Virginia and “which the Connecticut Legislature has in past sessions re-
fused to implement.”174 
Ultimately, both the ULC and the ALI acquiesced in 2008 to the “reality 
on the ground.”175 Thirty-three states had enacted Revised Article 1, and no 
jurisdiction—save the territory of the U.S. Virgin Islands—had enacted 
the 2001 version of section 1-301.176 The 2008 (and still current) version of 
section 1-301177 is, in the drafters’ words, “substantively identical to former 
Section 1-105” from original Article 1 with only stylistic changes.178 Put 
another way, official Article 1 once again requires that a transaction bear a 
“reasonable relation” to another American state or foreign nation before con-
tracting parties may choose the law of such a state or nation to govern their 
transaction.179 The official comments are, once again, a modest affair, cov-
ering less than 650 words,180 the brevity all the more magnified by contrast to 
the tally of nearly 4,500 words in the 2001 version.181 For the first time since 
2001, the official text of Article 1 reflected the dominant rule prevailing in 
the states. 
At the time of the repeal, Boris Auerbach of the ULC recounted oppo-
sition from “bankers associations, who were very concerned that somehow 
                                                                                                                         
174 Id. The Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act was, in early drafting, 
intended to be a new Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code, but ran into enormous 
criticism both as a possible part of the UCC and as a standalone uniform act. See David 
Frisch, Commercial Law’s Complexity, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 245, 247–48 (2011) (de-
scribing UCITA and its in-draft predecessors as having endured “heated criticism from 
consumer, business, and governmental groups ….”); Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of 
the UCITA Mass-Market Concept and Its Lessons for Policing of Standard Form Con-
tracts, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 393, 394 (2003) (describing “central flaw” of UCITA 
as being its “policy choice to allow digital producers to write their own intellectual 
property law using delayed standard form contracts”).  
175 Neil B. Cohen, 85th Annual Meeting: Discussion of Proposal to Amend §1-301 
(Choice of Law) of Revised Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 85 A.L.I. PROC. 
302 (2008). 
176 Id. 
177 See 85th Annual Meeting Program, Am. Law Inst., at 8–16 (May 2008), available at 
http://perma.cc/GVR7-A87H; Am. Law Inst., 85th Annual Meeting: 2008 Proceedings, 
85 A.L.I. PROC. 302–03 (2008).  
178 U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. (2014).  
179 Id. § 1-301(a). 
180 Id. § 1-301 cmt.  
181 Id. § 1-301 cmt. (2001). 
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these new rules and the new [consumer] protections would greatly affect 
them.”182 In particular, he described the banking interests as being concerned 
with the regulation of finance charges,183 even though the UCC does not 
regulate such charges. The bankers, Auerbach observed, “are a formidable 
group when it comes to state legislatures.”184 While interest groups and paro-
chial concerns likely played some role in the process,185 the misunder-
standing described by Auerbach seems inadequate to explain a failure as 
widespread, yet narrowly targeted, as that of proposed section 1-301. 
The demise of proposed section 1-301 was an exceptional moment in 
the UCC’s history. In fact, it stands out even more than the overwhelming 
rejection of the proposed 2003 revision of Articles 2 and 2A.186 The 2003 
versions of the articles governing the sale and lease of goods could be 
defeated by a lobbying effort capable of summary in two words: “Vote no.” 
The defeat of section 1-301 was more complex, as it occurred in the con-
text of a highly successful rewrite of Article 1. The more procedurally com-
plicated message accompanying Revised Article 1 was, “Vote yes, but 
change the choice-of-law section before you do so.” Each legislature was 
required, at some point in its process, to intentionally carve out choice-of-
law from the bill proposed by the ULC and ALI. The failure of proposed 
section 1-301 is extraordinary because it occurred in the simultaneous 
context of a highly successful Revised Article 1, and it holds lessons beyond 
mere interest-group politics regarding the dominant American conception 
of the nature of law. 
III. UNDERSTANDING FAILURE 
The potential for a zone of unbounded choice of law through the UCC 
is, for now, gone. This failure is more than a mere piece of legal history, 
however. The demise of proposed section 1-301 is instructive and has impli-
cations for future law-reform efforts. The choice-of-law proposal embodied 
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some independently laudable goals: legal certainty in transactions, effi-
ciency, consumer protection, and better integration of American commer-
cial law with international commercial norms in an era of increased economic 
globalization. Those goals, however, were ultimately sought at too high a 
price for the American legal tradition and its symbols. Rather than simply 
changing what American law does, proposed section 1-301 sought to change 
what the law is, at least in the popular conception. That was a step too far. 
In this Part, I first attempt to illustrate how section 1-301 suffered from 
a visceral reaction problem; that is, the choice-of-law proposal tended, outside 
of certain academic and business circles, to provoke a negative reaction 
before any analysis of its merits or problems. The more interesting ques-
tion is why such a negative visceral reaction occurred. Some have asserted 
that an unwillingness to conform American choice-of-law rules to interna-
tional practices is, at best, illogical,187 and at worst, xenophobic.188 I sug-
gest instead that the reaction has more complicated roots in a predominant 
American understanding of the nature of law. Second, I examine the issue 
in the context of legal philosophy, particularly in the lay understanding of 
the law, and show how section 1-301 ran contrary to that understanding. 
Finally, I consider political theory, particularly the role of myth and symbol, 
as a means for explaining American reticence toward allowing contractual 
choice of law on the scale originally embodied in Revised Article 1. Taken 
together, the visceral, legal philosophy, and political theory boundaries vio-
lated by proposed section 1-301 show that general applicability is a critical 
and central norm for achieving legal legitimacy in American law. 
A. The Visceral Reaction Problem: Counter-intuition 
Consider this statement: “Unrestricted choice of law sounds irrational.” 
The drafters and defenders of proposed section 1-301 would likely raise two 
strenuous objections to that proposition as applied to that statute. First, they 
would point out that proposed section 1-301 was not “unlimited.” In con-
sumer transactions, it actually prohibited contracting out of protective law in 
the consumer’s home jurisdiction.189 The proposal also contained a “fun-
damental policy” exception,190 which would prevent truly offensive mis-
chief by contracting parties and, at least conceptually, would short-circuit 
the parade of horribles that opponents of proposed 1-301 might advance. 
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Second, the proponents would undoubtedly object to characterizing the jet-
tisoning of the reasonable-relationship anchoring limitation on choice of law 
as “irrational.” Upon close consideration, many arguments and sound policies 
support the granting of greater party autonomy to sophisticated contracting 
parties in a private transaction.191 Even if one disagrees with the rationale 
for allowing such a high degree of autonomy for commercial parties, the 
argument cannot fairly be called irrational. 
Both of these objections have great merit, yet the statement stands: un-
restricted choice of law sounds irrational, especially at first blush and outside 
the halls of the academy and the international business community. More-
over, proposed section 1-301 sounds like unlimited choice of law, even where 
it substantively would have been no such thing. Consider this hypothetical 
fact pattern from the Official Comments by which the drafters sought to 
illustrate the scope of their proposal: 
[F]or example, in a non-consumer lease of goods in which the lessor is lo-
cated in Mexico and the lessee is located in Louisiana, a designation of 
the law of Ireland to govern the transaction would be given effect under 
this section even though the transaction bears no relation to Ireland.192 
This Ireland-law hypothetical, for which no facts are stated beyond those 
in the above excerpt, is a clear statement of just how far the UCC drafters 
intended party autonomy to extend. In that regard, the illustration is effec-
tive. The illustration, however, is equally effective in eliciting some flavor 
of the following reaction from the unprepared: “Huh?” If the reader questions 
the pervasiveness of this response, try soliciting a reaction to the Ireland-
law hypothetical from a group of (a) non-lawyers or (b) first-semester law 
students, or even try the hypothetical on an experienced attorney whose prac-
tice does not encompass substantial interaction with conflicts of law or 
trans-national law. The puzzled reaction may not be unanimous, but it will 
be widespread. 
In aid of his argument questioning the constitutionality of proposed sec-
tion 1-301, Professor Richard Greenstein posited some non-UCC hypothet-
icals that would provoke a response similar to the Ireland-law transaction. 
“As I sit here in my Philadelphia office,” writes Greenstein, “I might for some 
reason desire that my conduct be subject to Surinamese criminal law, rather 
than to that of Pennsylvania.”193 But, of course, such a previously expressed 
wish would not sway Pennsylvania authorities that sought to press criminal 
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charges. “My wife and I cannot by mere agreement” further writes the 
Pennsylvania resident, “cause California law to govern our marriage.”194 
On the surface, Professor Greenstein’s examples and the drafters’ ex-
ample from the Official Comments are the same: both illustrate law as 
something to be shopped for rather than being of general application. A 
fair-minded reader might object to that characterization, however. Crimi-
nal law and family law are quite different from a sophisticated commercial 
transaction in that the former are matters of public concern while the latter 
involves the creation of (arguably) entirely private rights. Nonetheless, the 
public-private distinction does not change the important surface common-
ality, which is that both involve law. 
The social understanding of law is that the “applicability of law is, to a 
significant extent, independent of the wishes of individuals.”195 In other 
words, virtually every provision of an unrelated jurisdiction’s law could 
conceivably be stated as express contract terms, and such terms could be 
enforceable as private terms rather than a body of public law.196 That func-
tional truth becomes irrelevant once the label of law is attached. The 
American social understanding changes along with the label. It matters 
what society calls “law” even where its substantive content or desirability 
is not known.197 
The drafters of Revised Article 1 and supporters of extensive party au-
tonomy have given a number of sound and detailed reasons why sophisti-
cated parties ought to be able to choose law that has no relationship to 
their transaction or contract.198 Those reasons, however, are counterintui-
tive. They take substantial time, space, and effort to explain. In the United 
States in particular, the idea of unbounded choice of law broadly evokes a 
negative visceral reaction because it actively defies common intuition of what 
law is.199 It would be easy to blame the negative response to proposed 
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section 1-301 on American parochialism or the influence of special interests 
fearful of the proposal’s potential for greater consumer protection. Those 
factors could and likely did contribute to the statute’s rejection, but they do 
not account for the reflexive and overwhelming negative reaction to it, a reac-
tion one can still duplicate with use of the hypotheticals stated in this Section. 
If the extent of the near-universal difficulties that proposed UCC section 
1-301 faced in state legislatures can be attributed to negative visceral reaction, 
then the source of that reaction should be identifiable. The idea that governing 
contract law can be unrelated to the transaction of the contract has gained 
considerable acceptance elsewhere.200 Yet in the United States, the concept 
faced so much initial skepticism as to require an unusually lengthy roadmap 
explaining why the bizarre-sounding idea actually made sense. It would be 
easy to dismiss the experience as an instance of American parochialism or 
anti-intellectualism that simply fails to come to terms with the cosmopolitan 
realities of law in the twenty-first century. That dismissal would be both pre-
mature and wrong. In fact, the reaction arises in large part from strands of 
legal philosophy and political theory that have strong, pervasive roots in the 
United States. 
B. The Legal Philosophy Problem: General Applicability 
Legal philosophy frequently occupies itself with all-encompassing theo-
retical questions such as explaining the nature of law or describing the rela-
tionship between law and morality.201 While those issues can lead to broad 
disagreement, even divergent legal philosophies overlap at some points, and 
such points are particularly descriptive of the popular culture of law in the 
United States. For example, H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller might disagree in 
their normative understandings of whether morality is inherent in law rather 
than entirely separate from it.202 Such disagreement, nonetheless, does not 
undermine the fact that both have articulated understandings of the nature 
of law that resonate strongly in the American experience, even where the 
understandings might be inconsistent.203 
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A useful starting point is with the understanding of what “law” is. In his 
essay “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue,” Joseph Raz observed that the as-
pirational maxim “government by law and not by men” is, in one respect, 
obscure.204 Government itself cannot exist without law, or else it is not gov-
ernment, but only the exercise of power. Since human beings establish the 
law and constitute the government, then “[s]urely government must be 
both by law and by men.”205 One possible logical reaction to this point would 
be to jettison the aspiration and assume that John Adams, Chief Justice 
Marshall, and others206 were mouthing an empty tautology. Raz, however, 
takes another approach. He finds that a dichotomy exists between the pro-
fessional and the layperson’s meaning of law. A lawyer will tend to recog-
nize anything as “the law” if it “meets the conditions of validity laid down in 
the system’s rules of recognition or in other rules of the system.”207 To the 
lawyer, law exists if its promulgation and authority are procedurally sound. 
The layperson’s conditions of validity, however, require more. To the non-
lawyer, “the law is essentially a set of open, general, and relatively stable 
laws.”208 As a result, finds Raz, “[g]overnment by law and not by men is 
not a tautology if ‘law’ means general, open, and relatively stable law.”209 
In other words, lawyers tend to view law as being all aspects of a legal sys-
tem, including the legal construction of the government. A layperson, in 
contrast, thinks of law as being enacted legal rules, such rules being open 
(that is, knowable by the law’s subjects), relatively stable (that is, not subject 
to change on frequent or arbitrary whim), and general.210 A normative base-
line of general applicability is crucial to the lay understanding of “law” once 
that label has been applied rather than some other, such as “contract term.” 
For present purposes, this quality of generality is most important, as it is 
an aspect of the layperson’s understanding of law that carries over with great 
force into descriptive legal philosophy, which is certainly not a province 
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of the layperson. “In a modern state,” noted H.L.A. Hart, for example, “it is 
normally understood that, in the absence of special indications widening or 
narrowing the class, its general laws extend to all persons within its terri-
torial boundaries.” 211 
Hart raised a dichotomy that is useful for present purposes: the separa-
tion of law into categories of primary rules and secondary rules.212 Primary 
rules are those that govern conduct by creating obligation to engage in or 
refrain from particular acts, such as the rules of criminal law and tort law.213 
All other legal rules, in Hart’s conception, are secondary rules.214 While 
secondary rules include matters of legal procedure—such as the process by 
which a legal rule comes to be recognized as valid law—secondary rules also 
include matters of private ordering and obligation, a category that includes 
the law of contracts. Hart introduced the distinction between primary and 
secondary rules, among other reasons, as a means to deal with inadequa-
cies in John Austin’s earlier theory of law,215 which explained law entirely 
in terms of being commands or coercive orders.216 Austin’s theory did not, 
without much twisting of the concept of coercion, deal with the categories 
of rules Hart placed in the secondary camp. Just as the layperson’s under-
standing of law tends to emphasize the importance of generality, it likewise 
emphasizes the role of Hart’s primary rules in the understanding of what 
“law” is. Returning to Raz’s point, then, the popular conception of law is that 
of general rules.217 While the private and procedural secondary rules are, as 
Hart asserts, qualitatively different from their primary brethren, the label of 
law is affixed to both, and that label has consequences.218 Both generality 
and primary-rule coercion are not descriptive qualities that necessarily fit in 
contract law, but they are intertwined with the popular conception of law. 
Furthermore, the popular conception of law—once the label of “law” 
has been applied to it—tends to include general applicability as a moral im-
perative. Lon Fuller articulated “eight demands of the law’s internal mo-
rality,”219 and at the very top of Fuller’s list is the requirement of generality. 
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His principal example of violation of generality is of administrative agen-
cies that, rather than issuing rules, decide matters on an ad hoc basis.220 
Fuller’s moral imperative of generality, however, does not always require 
that the law act impersonally, and states “that its rules must apply to general 
classes and should contain no proper names.”221 Yet generality is the guid-
ing normative principle rather than the exception, and “Constitutional pro-
visions invalidating ‘private laws’ and ‘special legislation’”222 are evidence 
of it. Ultimately, Fuller’s generality is “a principle of fairness,” which is 
an integral aspect of the morality of the law.223 
Generality is a crucial quality of law, both in the popular conception 
and in philosophic conceptions. A broad underlying lay understanding of law 
is that it is general in its application. Although the generality principle exists 
as a matter of legal theory, it has a widespread “common-sense of fairness” 
aspect to it as well. Proposed section 1-301, I suggest, contradicted this 
understanding. But should such a contradiction matter, and why would the 
ability to contract out of generally applicable law be especially problematic 
in American jurisdictions? To whatever extent legal philosophy sheds light 
on the rejection of proposed section 1-301, that light might well be illusory. 
American state legislators and their constituents were almost certainly not 
reading Hart and Raz (British legal philosophers) after all. One can, never-
theless, legitimately connect the normative value of generality from legal 
philosophy to the failure of section 1-301, and that is by consideration of the 
role of myth and symbol in the United States. 
C. The Political Theory Problem: Myth and Symbol 
Political theory explaining the American tradition aids in understanding 
the fate of potentially unbounded choice of law represented by proposed 
section 1-301, and of particular importance is the work of Eric Voegelin and 
those applying his theories of political science. Myths and symbols, accord-
ing to Voegelin, play a critical role in the political self-interpretation of a 
people.224 The myths and symbols representing the idea that no one being 
is above the law, and of government of laws and not of men, are potent in 
the American political understanding. Proposed section 1-301 was, from its 
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outset, doomed to an uphill battle due to its violation of the general appli-
cability norm reflected in these ideals. 
The idea that law is generally applicable is a foundational, potent myth 
in the American political tradition. Use of the term “myth” is not intended 
to disparage a story or otherwise suggest that it is false. Rather, an idea 
rising to the level of “myth” suggests that it has achieved a high and per-
vasive level of cultural significance, regardless of its truth or falsity. The 
aspiration to be a nation of laws and not of men is a story “soaked up by 
living in a particular place and time” such that, in the United States in the 
early twenty-first century, the story has “become part of us … ready to or-
chestrate our understanding of the world, including the world of law.”225 
Myth playing a role in law is not a new idea, even as it relates to the 
UCC.226 For example, the idea of a medieval and transnational law by which 
merchants policed themselves—a lex mercatoria—is firmly ensconced in 
the Code, which to this very day purports not to fully displace “the law 
merchant.”227 Though the point is hotly contested, some scholars have gone 
so far as to assert that historical evidence does not actually support the 
existence of a medieval law merchant, at least in its common understand-
ing.228 The possible existence or non-existence of lex mercatoria, however, 
is irrelevant to its status. The story has attained such a level of legal mythol-
ogy that it lives on, holding too much symbolic power as an ideal of border-
less commercial law for it ever to vanish.229 Foundational myths like the 
law merchant “are not falsifiable by new evidence because their truth lies 
not in empirics but in a common faith.”230 
The Voegelin usage of myth and symbol as a descriptive matter, in con-
trast, is not inherently positive or negative. It simply is. Political scientists 
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writing in the Voegelin tradition find that myths and symbols are the nec-
essary means by which people constitute themselves into a political society. 
Political scientist Donald Lutz, for example, described the role of symbols 
and myths as providing a people’s “meaning to their existence together” 
and serving to “link them to some transcendent order” 231 that allows them 
to act as a people in answering foundational political questions:  
Through what procedures do we reach collective decisions? By what 
standards do we judge our actions? What qualities or characteristics do 
we strive to maintain among ourselves? What kind of people do we wish 
to become? What qualities or characteristics do we seek or require of 
those who lead us?232  
“Far from being the repository of irrationality,” concludes Lutz, “shared 
myths and symbols constitute the basis upon which collective, rational action 
is possible.”233 Put another way, these ideals are foundational to a group 
whose members have bound themselves together as a people or a nation. 
Thus, in applying Voegelin’s approach, the ideas and stories that obtain 
this foundational status for the Jewish people can be found in the Torah in 
stories of the call of Abraham,234 the Exodus,235 and the Law of Moses.236 
For the ancient Athenians, to take another example, Thucydides recorded 
foundational self-definition in Pericles’ funeral oration.237 The Athenians 
envisioned their law around the symbol of democracy: 
Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighbouring states; we are 
rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its administration fa-
vours the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy. If 
we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private dif-
ferences; if no social standing, advancement in public life falls to repu-
tation for capacity, class considerations not being allowed to interfere 
with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve 
the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition.238 
In essence, whether Athens consistently lived up to ideals of equal jus-
tice and disregard of wealth and class is irrelevant. Pericles’ oration was 
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still the answer for each Athenian to the question of “What do I assert as 
true, as good, as meaningful, as beautiful?”239 The fact that the Athenians 
as a society had answers to these questions is indicative of their success at 
being a people instead of a mere population of individuals. These concepts 
and ideals defined who they were as a people in contrast to the rest of the 
world, and in contrast to their authoritarian Spartan enemies in particular. 
So how does such political theory relate to the UCC and choice of law? 
The American myth and symbol of general applicability of law did not by 
itself doom proposed section 1-301. The complete overthrow of general 
applicability, however, made the proposal unlikely to succeed as a prominent 
default rule. The overarching view of contracted-for law as a default rule 
rather than an exceptional case is fundamentally inconsistent with the way 
Americans have defined themselves as a people.240 One who can consistently 
contract out of law is, at first blush, above the law, and a body of law that 
invites its treatment to be on an ad hoc basis is, in essence, a government 
of men (and women) rather than a government of laws. The British legal 
philosophers Hart and Raz were surely not thinking of American political 
culture and theory when they addressed law’s generality. Voegelin’s political 
theory of myth and symbol likewise was not articulated with commercial 
law in mind. Yet there is a fit. Proposed section 1-301 induced a negative 
visceral reaction in much of its audience, and the central role of generality 
as an American myth and symbol goes far to explain the reaction. 
IV. MAKING FAILURE MATTER 
One could reasonably suggest that proposed section 1-301 failed in 
part because it was un-American. But that statement would be loaded with 
McCarthyite overtones and calls for immediate disassembly. Unbounded 
choice of law is not nefarious. Rather, proposed section 1-301 could be la-
beled un-American only in the same way that the Eiffel Tower and the 
French Revolution are un-American; these things are—for good or for 
ill—simply not part of the American experience. Outside of elite quarters, 
American legal and political culture tends not to be receptive to an idea that 
has succeeded elsewhere: the idea that broad swaths of something called 
“law” are, as a normative matter, something out of which individual parties 
should be able to contract. 
                                                                                                                         
239 WILMOORE KENDALL & GEORGE W. CAREY, THE BASIC SYMBOLS OF THE AMERICAN 
POLITICAL TRADITION 21 (1970) (explaining the Voegelin usage of myth and symbol). 
240 Cf. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 14 (1998) (observ-
ing that law in America resists change based prior definitions of who constitutes “We the 
People” even after the establishment of “a more expansively conceived People”). 
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In addition, by substantially ascribing the failure of proposed section 
1-301 to a negative visceral reaction grounded in American political theory 
that values particular aspects of legal philosophy, I do not for a moment 
imagine that state legislators and lobbyists were pondering deeply the myths 
and symbols contained in Founding Era documents. The Connecticut ex-
perience with Revised Article 1 certainly suggests otherwise, showing self-
serving interests241 just as much at work as one would expect anywhere in 
representative democracy.242 What I do suggest, however, is that the sym-
bolic aspiration of having “a government of laws and not of men” where 
“no one is above the law” is so powerful and deeply rooted in American 
political and legal culture that the stage was already set for proposed sec-
tion 1-301 to fail. 
In this Part, I assert that we can and should view the failure of proposed 
section 1-301 as an object lesson. Specifically, we can usefully learn how to 
think about and understand the dominant American view of general applica-
bility of legal rules, particularly the relationship of general applicability to 
legal legitimacy. Here, I propose a framework for such an understanding 
to help predict and account for future difficulties where the American view of 
default general applicability of legal rules conflicts with other goals, such 
as accommodating globalization. We can account for differing views of 
general applicability just as we account for conflicts in legal processes and 
remedies between civil law and common law systems. Mere recognition that 
the conflict exists is the first step to working around the conflict. 
A. The Socio-Legal Working Zone 
Unbounded choice of law, I have suggested, tends to provoke a visceral 
negative reaction, and the reasons for this reaction in the American politi-
cal and legal system are neither xenophobic nor irrational. First, the lay 
philosophical understanding of legitimate law is that it is by default generally 
applicable. While “[i]t is humanly inconceivable that law can consist only 
of general rules”243 the public expectation of law is that it does precisely 
that, except where necessity requires otherwise. Such necessity is exceptional, 
even if it is also common. Second, the shared myths and symbols of self-
governance in the American tradition require a norm of general application 
                                                                                                                         
241 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (“The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man …. But the 
most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribu-
tion of property.”). 
242 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(describing a necessary quality of republican government as a structure where “[a]mbition 
must be made to counteract ambition”). 
243 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 213 (1979). 
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of legal rules. The ideal of “a nation of laws and not of men”244 is an inherent 
part of how this body politic has defined itself and how it acts. 
The identification of reasons for visceral negative reactions to unbounded 
party autonomy is perhaps interesting, but is it at all useful? I suggest that 
it is, and that understanding the role of general applicability in the American 
political and legal system provides a framework and boundaries for future 
attempts at integrating the American system with any “international norms” 
of the sort that inspired proposed section 1-301. In other words, if one ac-
cepts that section 1-301 was overreaching and too clever by half, might one 
be able to determine the boundaries where it overreached? 
Figure 1 below is an attempt to conceptualize in graphic form the rela-
tionship between general applicability of a duly enacted legal rule (that is, 
assuming no procedural irregularities in the rule’s enactment) and excep-
tions to that same rule. The quantitative extent of rule-exceptions forms the 
independent variable along the Y-axis, with perceived legitimacy constitut-
ing the dependent variable along the X-axis. The parabolic curve represents 
the potential points at which some form of the rule can exist. 
 
                                                                                                                         
244 See supra note 2. 
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At its extremes, our hypothetical rule faces problems either of practi-
cability or legitimacy. At the bottom of the parabolic curve, the rule is gener-
ally applicable to all persons subject to a jurisdiction’s authority. While the 
applicability of such a rule lends to its perception as legitimate, its com-
pletely uniform application is impractical because of undue social costs (for 
example, unjust outcomes), undue transactional costs (such as enforcement 
difficulty), or some combination of both. At the top of the curve, in contrast, 
our rule lacks any pretense to general applicability, and exceptions by 
waiver or opt-out are so vast as to call into question not only the wisdom of 
the rule, but its very claim to legitimacy. The middle of the curve, accord-
ingly, is the working zone for socio-legal legitimacy. Here, the rule has suf-
ficient exceptions and flexibility built in such that its results are not unjust or 
outrageously expensive, but the rule is not so far from the general-application 
norm as to undermine its claim to be legitimate and evenly enforced law. 
B. Contractual Choice of Law to Illustrate 
Applying the general scheme described in Figure 1, the graph below 
states in visual terms how proposed section 1-301 and other past standards 
for governing contractual choice of law would compare to one another. 
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The pure and rigid vested-rights theory of the first Restatement of Con-
flicts of Law has the great benefit of general applicability contributing to 
its legitimacy. No one is above the law, which is applied evenhandedly, 
albeit with a lack of equity. Nevertheless, this Joseph Beale approach, despite 
its claim to legitimacy, must eventually falter. The social cost of certainty—
prominent miscarriage of substantive justice—is simply too great. Sure 
enough, the first Restatement began to break down at its inception, first with 
escape devices that excused strict application,245 and eventually overwhelm-
ing displacement by the conflicts revolution and interest analysis.246 
Toward the top of the curve, the autonomy-granting section 1-301 ex-
cels in its flexibility, but creates so many holes in the fabric of general ap-
plicability that it undermines the popular American conception of law. 
Something called “law” at this point on the chart has become a thing that, 
as a default matter, parties can freely choose to avoid. Here, the principle of 
general applicability has been so undermined as to call into question the law’s 
legitimacy and its very entitlement to be called “law.” Stated differently, be-
ing above the law has risen from a disfavored aberration to a systemic norm. 
In the acceptable zone, then, is the UCC’s once and current reasonable-
relation rule (and one could just as easily place section 187 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflicts of Law within the zone). In the middle range 
of the curve, contractual choice of law is authorized and occurs as a conces-
sion to practicality, avoiding the difficulties inherent as value on the X-axis 
increases. Many contracts have viable connections to multiple jurisdictions, 
and each of those jurisdictions has a colorable claim to having its law gov-
ern the contract. Giving the contracting parties autonomy to resolve the 
question of which law to apply in that situation is the least-bad solution to 
transactional uncertainty. Giving discretion to the parties does some harm to 
perception on the X-axis and allows for potential transactional mischief. It 
is, nonetheless, a workable middle-road between the culturally-valued myth 
of general applicability and the uncomfortable social costs of certainty with-
out exception. 
General applicability is not an absolute requirement, nor is it even a de-
sirable feature in its absolute form. Indeed, the position away from extreme 
                                                                                                                         
245 See William M. Richman & David Riley, The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws 
on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Its Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional 
Courts, 56 MD. L. REV. 1196, 1206 (1997) (suggesting that the sustained need for “rule 
manipulation and the system of escape devices” ultimately led many courts to reject the 
first Restatement of Conflict of Laws). 
246 Lea Brilmayer & Raechel Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the Metaphysics of 
the Stand-Alone Trigger, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1132 (2010) (“When the system of loop-
holes and exceptions [in the first Restatement] collapsed under its own weight, bellwether 
states like California and New York took their first steps toward modern ‘interest analysis.’”). 
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general applicability has the honored position of being the desirable “spirit 
of the law” that contrasts with the hard-nosed “letter of the law.” A just 
government should have some ability to create exceptions where the letter 
of the law leads to an undesirable result. Bounded discretion is a necessary 
feature of law in a liberal democracy. 
Contractual choice of law is thus, in the American view, more of a neces-
sary evil than a flexible transactional good (though it has qualities of both). 
The analogy that best makes this point is a comparison with forum shopping, 
which could also be expressed on the above graph. Forum shopping, of 
course, is popularly defined as a litigant's attempt “to have his action tried 
in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most 
favorable judgment or verdict.”247 The American legal system, particularly 
since the Supreme Court’s articulation of the Erie doctrine,248 has viewed 
forum shopping as inappropriate and undesirable.249 Why? The oft repeated 
“twin aims” of the Erie rule are “discouragement of forum-shopping and 
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”250 In principle, equita-
ble administration of the law would mean that all courts evaluating the same 
facts under the same law would, with certainty, reach the same result. That 
ideal—absolute equitable administration of the laws—is impossible, of 
course, but Erie and its progeny sought to make forum shopping the dis-
couraged exception rather than a rewarded norm. Inherent in the nature of 
having a federal system and human judges means that, as a necessary evil, 
some forum shopping will still occur. Widespread exploitation of rules that 
incidentally allow forum shopping is, however, not the same thing as a de-
fault rule that opens up forum shopping across the board. The myth and 
symbol of equal treatment under the law remains intact in a way that it 
could not in a judicial system that allows forum shopping as a matter of 
course. The Erie doctrine’s condemnation of forum shopping is simply an-
other manifestation of the general applicability norm in American law. A 
system where forum shopping was a fully authorized default practice would 
be positioned quite near proposed UCC section 1-301 on the graph. The 
actual system, which allows some degree of forum shopping by necessity 
rather than as a systemic good, would be positioned near the “reasonable 
relation” rule on the graph. 
                                                                                                                         
247 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 655 (6th ed. 1990). 
248 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
249 See Alan M. Trammell, Toil and Trouble: How the Erie Doctrine Became Struc-
turally Incoherent (and How Congress Can Fix It), 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3249, 3272 
(2014) (“The idea that forum shopping is inherently evil has become part of the received 
wisdom about Erie …. Scholars largely have accepted that received wisdom, even when 
they criticize the Erie doctrine on other grounds.”) (internal footnotes omitted); Note, 
Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677 (1990). 
250 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
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Contractual choice of law is conceptually both a necessary evil and a 
tool for transactional good. The dominant concept varies with the person 
imagining it. Just as a potential piece of litigation could arguably be tied to 
multiple courts and court systems, so too can the governance of a contract 
be tied to multiple bodies of law. Within limits, a plaintiff can successfully 
select a more favorable forum; within similar limits, contracting parties can 
choose their law from arguably applicable law. The idea of being able to 
obtain a legal outcome by selection of forum does, certainly in the abstract, 
induce an unfavorable visceral reaction. Unbounded contractual choice of 
law does likewise. 
CONCLUSION: THE POWERFUL SYMBOL 
In those days there was no king in Israel: every man did that 
which was right in his own eyes.251 
Proposed UCC section 1-301 plausibly represented the wave of com-
mercial law’s future at the time of the promulgation of Revised UCC Arti-
cle 1. The treatment of contractual choice of law had been, over the twentieth 
century, an arc bending toward party autonomy. The 2001 proposal appeared 
to be, if not an ultimate destination, a highly probable or even inevitable stop 
along the way. It fully embodied the concept of contracts—non-consumer 
contracts, at least—as being matters of private ordering: the parties who 
chose to be bound to a contract could choose the body of law that governed 
that relationship. Well-informed and well-intentioned scholars—not least of 
whom included the voting membership of the ALI and the ULC—backed 
this point of law reform that would have put American commercial law in 
line with widespread international norms. But the plan failed. It was too 
clever by half. 
For all of the consideration of the practical benefits and justifications 
of parties being able to select their private contract law, the concept hit 
great resistance in the United States because it was private contract law. 
Legal philosophers ponder the question of what law is because assigning 
the label of “law” to a body of rules has consequences. In the American pop-
ular and legal tradition, the consequence of a rule being a law implies at 
                                                                                                                         
251 Judges 21:25. This description—not intended in its source to be complimentary—
strikes me as an appropriate metaphor for the way unbounded choice of law fits in the 
American legal and political tradition; that is, unbounded choice of law does not fit ter-
ribly well. Credit for earlier metaphorical use of the quotation goes to historian Peter 
Novick. See PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND 
THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 628 (1988) (describing the collapse of consensus 
on meaning and role of objectivity in American historiography in chapter obliquely entitled 
“There was no king in Israel”). 
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least a background adherence to general applicability. After all, no one is 
above the law in a nation of laws and not of men.252 The conceptual symbols 
and myths baked into the preceding sentence are immensely powerful.253 
Because proposed section 1-301 traversed these symbols and myths, it un-
intentionally was a frontal assault on a foundational principle to the public 
legitimacy of the law. The statute provoked a substantial visceral reaction 
against it for that reason. A private party having the unbounded ability to 
shop around for something called “law” does not fit the American conception 
of what law is. While a free market can be a beneficial thing in its proper 
place, law in the ingrained American view is not an enterprise out of which 
parties should have a general right to contract. Contractual choice of law 
is, rather like forum shopping in civil litigation, a price one must pay as a 
consequence of having multiple and overlapping legal systems. Proposed 
section 1-301 went too far in that it elevated the act of contracting around 
generally applicable law to a norm, rather than an exception. 
The failure of proposed section 1-301 is more than a one-time event: 
instead, it is a cautionary tale for future law-reform efforts in the United 
States, particularly those motivated by ongoing globalization. Legal cultures 
include symbols and myths, and the story of law having general application 
is a particularly powerful one of these in American jurisdictions. Though it 
seems counterintuitive, unbounded contractual choice of law makes sense 
in practice but failed because it did not work in theory. Drafters of uniform 
laws, model codes, and treaties are well-advised to consider political symbols 
and myth in addition to the concrete policy implications of their proposals. 
In the United States, the ideal of law’s general applicability is a powerful 
symbol that cannot be easily traversed. 
                                                                                                                         
252 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
253 See ACKERMAN, supra note 240, at 12–13 (“America is a legalistic country. As soon 
as reformers attempt an end-run around established principles and procedures, they will 
hand their opponents a potent political weapon.”). 
